An Approximate English Translation of an Open Letter sent to the newly elected President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Massoud Pezeshkian

by Mehrdad Khonsari  

In the name of the vigilant people of Iran

The early and unexpected presidential election last month, in which more than 50% of the Iranian electorate boycotted the election process in the decisive round (with more than 60% having boycotted the first stage), reflects profound popular apathy with the current political situation in the country. However, with your accession as President,  you now have the possibility of converting several of your key electoral promises into action. thereby addressing some of the legitimate demands of the overwhelming majority of disaffected Iranians, who have lost all hope for a better future.

We are fully aware that current structural limitations  and restrictions  imposed by powerful monopolistic forces act as a major impediment to meeting the nation’s expectations.  However, as you have mentioned so many times before, you claim to be committed to fulfilling the wishes of our suffering people. Therefore, you should be seen to be moving beyond mere sloganeering, especially now that you have completed such expected rituals as attending  ‘self-flagellation’’ ceremonies and dispensing messages of friendship and solidarity to the likes of Hezbollah and the Houthis. 

Thus, in light of all that you have promised, you are now at least expected to be seen as being resolved to resist or push back against the monopolistic forces of the Deep State.  No doubt, judgment on the part of the overwhelming majority of those who either supported you during or after the election process (such as the likes of ‘Mawlana Abdolhamid Ismaeelzahi, the most influential religious and social leader of the Sunni community in Zahedan and others), will ultimately depend on your performance in transforming promises into action from day one. 

It is clear that any move on your part to defend and promote the interests in the Iranian nation can only be achieved by adopting a manner that is completely different from the past.  This can only happen by taking into account and creating sensible relations with all the people of Iran, both inside and outside the country, and by using all the vast and precious talents that are undoubtedly the greatest treasure of our nation.  

It follows that any move under whatever pretext that is against the direction of widening general  participation to include fresh, educated and technocratic  minds in the reconstruction of Iran will be tantamount to nothing less than ignoring the priorities, demands as well as the hopes of millions of people, especially the deprived youth and women of our nation. 

Therefore, I suggest that by bravely coming to a realization of the most palpable and undeniable facts before us in these critical and decisive times, you should choose the path of "national reconciliation". In this way, you will help to prepare the ground for the construction of a new and better Iran based on mutual coexistence and general participation, which will serve all our citizens as well as our future generations. 

Today, it is an undeniable fact that it is no longer possible to guarantee the perpetuation of the current situation with all its obvious inadequacies by simply relying on state power and repression to suppress a bitterly discontented population. 

So, by being resolute in exercising the powers that are realistically within your grasp, you should be capable of addressing some of the key issues listed below: 

• A determined effort conducted both behind the scenes as well as in public to free all political prisoners as well as those detained under house arrest. 
• Efforts to prevent any kind of violence against women and unquestioning support for their legitimate rights and demands. 
• Establishing specific communication channels with civil society and with political and social figures who have been critical of the status quo, in order to listen and provide resonance to the voices of the silent and protesting majority who seek change in ways that are reasonable and low-cost, for a peaceful transition to a future that is in line with the status and dignity of the Iranian nation. 
• Restoring balance in the country's foreign policy by ending unnecessarily provocative and damaging confrontational policies with the West.  Creating such a balance will not only lead to a gradual improvement in the terrible state of daily life faced by ordinary Iranians but it will also put the country on a more secure path for safeguarding its security, defending its national interests and promoting economic development. 
• Making Iran party to the FATF Protocol and other such agreements for reasons of promoting genuine and meaningful changes in people's lives (such as fighting corruption and promoting meritocracy). 

On the eve of the historic occasion marking the 118th anniversary of Iran's constitutional Revolution, perhaps you have a historic opportunity to present a different image of your new government. This can only be achieved if you choose to adopt a positive step-by-step approach to regain the lost trust of the Iranian people and help with the process of national healing and reconciliation. The pursuit of such a path, can undoubtedly set the stage for the valuable participation of a much greater number of Iranians who have dedicated their lives to restoring Iran's much damaged reputation and rightful position in the international community. 

Mehrdad Khonsari
30 July 2024
www.icps.uk

Equal shareholders in Iran Plc: Promoting justice and equality & ending discriminations

An ICPS ‘White Paper’
 

Note

Views and suggestions expressed in this ‘White Paper’ that has been produced by the "Iranian Center for Political Studies" (ICPS), are based on the presentations and discussions that were held between various parties, following a meeting that was held in Paris on 16 June 2924. However, it is important to underline that the report presented below has been  compiled by ICPS itself. In the course of that ‘closed meeting’ (that was to the point and away from an atmosphere of confrontation and controversies), a group of Iranian political and ethnic experts and activists (Persians, Kurds, Turks, Arabs and Balochis) who had gathered at the invitation of ICPS, discussed some of the key and most sensitive issues concerning the future of the kind of reforms needed for ensuring justice and equality for all of Iran’s ethnic groups.

By publishing a summary of the views expressed, ICPS is hopeful that  moderates on all sides of the ethnic divide in Iran are able to soberly pursue a course of positive dialogue that is cognizant on the one side all pf the sufferings and the depth of discriminations and other problems that ethnic Iranians have endured, while also drawing attention to and underlining the practical hurdles and complications that need to be overcome in order to reach the consensus that is required for paving the path of national unity and peaceful coexistence where all citizens are ‘equal shareholders in Iran Plc’.

Introduction

While the most immediate dichotomy and contradiction affecting Iranian society today, is the rift that exists between the majority of the Iranian people and the ruling theocratic regime (also referred to as the ‘Deep State’), we are at the same time witnessing a series of other cultural and political differences and contradictions. Apart from increasing conflict between the supporters and the opponents of an unpopular so-called Islamic regime, various other differences and contradictions also exist amongst monarchists, republicans, advocates of ‘centralism and federalism’, feminists, reformists, those wanting to overthrow the regime.

The conduct of discourse amongst all the of afore mentioned groups that perhaps in broader terms, includes the ‘pros and cons’ of the 1979 Revolution, can overshadow and influence the way that the Iranian people deal with their most important and fundamental priority, namely posing a meaningful challenge to the ruling theocracy.

The preferred approach, recommended by the ‘Iranian Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS)’, has been to encourage critical dialogue and honest discussion around the various existing contentious issues between moderate and rational elements amongst various the various ethnic groups as well as other parties. It is essential noting here, that in comparison to numerous areas and issues of national contention and debate, there exists a large degree of commonality of views between important segments of monarchist, nationalist, and republican movements.

The striking and widely-supported 2022-2023 ‘Women-Life-Freedom’ Movement in Iran conveyed two important messages for everyone. On the one hand, it made people in the society at large (especially in non-ethnic areas) aware of the deep and painful discrimination that has been directed against their fellow citizens in some parts of Iran. On the other hand, it vividly displayed in no uncertain terms, not just to all people in Iran but also to the wider international community, the desire that exists for solidarity and national unity (as displayed by people’s slogans in all parts of Iran), regardless of their ethnicity.

Based on this remarkable display of national cohesion, the ‘Iranian Center for Political Studies’ (ICPS), organized a ‘closed seminar’ that was held in Paris on 16 July 2024 to discuss issues of critical importance that pertain to  a wide range of contentious matters such as  ‘decentralization’ as well as pressing topics such as ‘eliminating discrimination’, with the participation of different Iranian ethnicities (Kurds, Turks, Arabs, Balochis, etc) along with a number of political activists and academic experts.  

In the course of this seminar, important areas of concern were frankly and freely addressed with a view of drafting a kind of ‘White Paper’ – i.e., a policy document produced in order to set out a series of proposals which could serve as a basis for future constructive dialogue between all the concerned parties. 

What follows is a summary of the suggestions that were made in the course of the ICPS seminar which aimed to promote the pursuit of constructive dialogue that is much needed for the attainment of an acceptable compromise on the various aspects relating to these important issues of national concern for the future of Iran. 

Decentralization & Elimination of discrimination

A draft proposal

The draft proposal below can be discussed and amended within the framework of a national dialogue with the participation of moderate and reasonable elements from all relevant parties, searching for an acceptable solution that can address most (if not all) of the key areas of concern that encompass the issue of  decentralization, including the elimination of all forms of discrimination in Iran.

ONE

Iran is a country that is comprised of one nation containing a ‘rainbow of people’. This rainbow with its various cultures, languages and religions, as well as economic and political capacities, should be seen in light of the potential opportunities that it offers and not as a threat to the cohesion of the nation.

Furthermore, the presence of people with different languages ​​and religions, especially in the peripheral areas of the country, who share many similarities with the people across the borders, is well placed for the promotion of development and good neighbourly relations with the various neighbouring states.

TWO

The underlying prerequisite for any kind of meaningful dialogue between moderates is that all the views and arguments should take place in an atmosphere that is based on good-faith and devoid of negative prejudices and stereotyping. In addition to enhancing mutual knowledge and expanding shared horizons, such a dialogue can also play an effective role in highlighting and giving prominence to the priorities and concerns of other parties, thus building mutual trust, which is an essential requirement for the future construction of a new order in Iran.

THREE

No one person or movement can claim to be the representative or the spokesperson of all the people, either in the entirety of the country or of any specific region. Thus, they can only put forward their own points of view or at most those of the organizations they represent.

FOUR

Since lack of familiarity with certain terminologies used by participants in such discussions could lead to potential misunderstandings, in order to avoid new problems or disputes, it is suggested that the word "ethnic" and the expression "preserving territorial cohesion" [«حفظ یکپارچگی سرزمینی»] should be used in the same vein (i.e., inter-changeable) with such terms as “Nation” and “territorial integrity” [ملت و تمامیت ارضی][1]

FIVE

The vast majority of the participants agreed about the existence of discrimination in different regions of Iran (especially in ‘ethnic’ regions), and some differences of views were expressed regarding the manner that such discriminations could be interpreted, analysed and potentially resolved. It was also noted that the practice of discrimination was multifaceted – i.e., political, economic, religious, linguistic discrimination, and as such, it should not be seen merely as a solitary issue. 

SIX

Parliamentary democracy respecting the rights of all citizens that was based on the concept of  ‘one person one vote’, while an important necessity for Iran and all Iranians, it is, nonetheless, insufficient by itself. According to previous historical experiences, the model of a ‘centralized parliamentary democracy’ may not be the best solution for eliminating discrimination in Iran. Therefore, one should try and look for a more suitable model to eliminate discrimination.

Discounting historical times in Iran, and especially in the period from the establishment of constitutional governments to the present, various models such as state and provincial assemblies, local councils, associations and the like, as well as demands for autonomy, federalism, etc., have all been suggested in response for dealing with the issue of decentralization.

SEVEN

The question of "decentralization", in terms of a solution, is altogether a different, larger and more fundamental  topic than the issue of "federalism". Hence, proper attention should be focused on discussing the areas that separate these topics. Also, historical memories and different past practices - both positive and negative - that exist in the minds of different people in Iran concerning these concepts, should facilitate meaningful conversation as well as creating a suitable framework for decision-making by moderate political activists and academic researchers.

EIGHT

Nationalist forces (i.e., advocates of ‘one nation’ model or proposition) and defenders of such a ‘centralized system’ should be encouraged to understand the concerns of an important segment of the Iranian people who suffer from regional, ethnic, linguistic and religious discriminations and the alike. Moreover, they should be encouraged to refrain from any type of resort to undue prejudices or recriminations against those who speak in defence of a different model. 

NINE

For their part, supporters of federalism, in defending the model of their choice, are also encouraged to adopt a manner that is also devoid of provocative language and pre-dispositions. They need to understand the concerns on the part of an important body of people and political forces in the country, who believe that ‘federalism’, could be a steppingstone to a situation whereby the territorial integrity of the Iranian nation is compromised.

TEN

All political activists and idealistic intellectuals, including ‘nationalists’ and ‘federalists’, should separate the domains that exist between ‘values’ and ‘strategies’ (or ideology and strategy) so that they can then establish the proper relationship and links that needs to exist between them. They can promote all their values ​​and defend all their beliefs in the public arena and the media as much as possible, but in the field of strategy, they need to be able to come up with practical, consensual and democratic ways for the realization of their goals.

In the field of values, the criterion is "truth", and in the field of strategy, the criterion is "success". If nationalists on the one hand and the federalists on the other want to deal as much as possible in the strategic field and do not find ways of reaching an agreement in some kind of a ‘win-win situation’, then the country could suffer violent turmoil in the future, exposing people to further oppression and dictatorship.

Such a scenario could potentially lead to a situation whereby military or populist elements can gain the upper hand by attaining full domination over the ‘idealists on both sides of the equation’.  Repeated political experiences in Iran and the world have shown that if you are unwilling to compromise or modify your demands, it is often the case that everything is lost and the game is ultimately forfeited to other parties.

ELEVEN

The ‘language issue’ is one of the more important issues in any discussion pertaining to ‘decentralization’. Most of the participants were in agreement regarding the problems that surround primary education in the ‘non-Persian regions’ of the country, although the problem has diminished in recent years to some extent due to the growth of factors such as mass media and social networks.

Participants in the seminar were unanimous in the opinion that Persian language should be the official language of the land [classified as the language of communication and mediation] - with the additional proviso  that there can be more than one official language – along with other languages ​​(including the English for scientific purposes) if approved by a future Constituent Assembly.

Some participants representing ethnic views also suggested that the ‘mother tongue’ could also be included in school curriculums for a number of years of primary education (the exact number of years should be decided by a panel of experts). However, attention was also drawn to a number of practical complications in this regard (e.g., language at the place of birth, mother's tongue, and parents with two different languages, etc.).

TWLEVE

Teaching in the mother tongue, an issue that must be decided by the parents of any child, at any level is optional and not mandatory.

THIRTEEN

Many participants, including some personalities from ethnic regions, agreed that a consensual system for ‘decentralization’ can be started based on the existing provincial divisions. Some research and field studies based on land surveying can serve as a guide, for supplementing and facilitating decision-making in this regard. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that extensive migrations, ethnic complications caused by mixed marriages and the alike, have made this problem even more complicated.

FOURTEEN

With regards to the division of powers and duties in an appropriate ‘decentralized system’ or model for Iran, the views of experts in such fields can be taken into consideration.

Ethnic participants believed that issues related to macro-economics, foreign policy and matters pertaining to national defence should be under the control of the central government, while the remaining issues should be devolved and should come under the control of various provinces. Referring to historical experiences, some attendees believed that any appropriate model towards this end can be started on a trial-and-error basis so that the best and most efficient way forward may be found.

FIFTEEN

"Positive discrimination" for ethnic areas or areas that have suffered discrimination on a wider basis, can be a guiding factor and an independent indicator for planning and implementing new measures.

SIXTEEN

In certain experiences in decentralization models in other parts of the world, a single model has not been considered appropriate for the whole country and some geographical and ethnic areas have had different decentralization models with different powers. Such examples and  considerations can also be taken into account in planning for a decentralized system.

SEVENTEEN

Between the three systems of "centralized" (e.g., Iran and France), "federal" (e.g., Germany) and a "regional" system that lies between the previously mentioned two models (e.g., Switzerland and Spain), the third system is perhaps a more suitable model to be considered in the case of Iran on the basis of full adherence to two preconditions, namely secularism and democracy. A number of ethnic participants present in the seminar were adamant that for them, "content of the system" was by far more important than its form, appearance or title (for example, federalism).

EIGHTEEN

All discussions, examinations leading to final decisions about the future political management structures of the country, including the resolution of issues regarding discrimination and decentralization, should be conducted in a democratically elected Constituent Assembly.

All people and political tendencies actively engaged in the democratic process in convening a Constituent Assembly, irrespective of  whatever standing they may have on various issue , will be bound by all the ultimate decisions made by the Assembly.

NINETEEN

Believers on both sides of the ‘ethnic divide’, along with supporters and opponents of ‘centralization/decentralization’, as well as federalism or any other political model, in looking at Iran's various concerns and problems from a wider perspective,  can in principle agree to come together on a series of common views, by deferring final decisions on all other outstanding issues to the democratically elected Constituent Assembly.

However, most active political/ethnic groups, are generally believed to have shared/common views and perspectives regarding the following areas:

1. Democracy based on human rights
2. Secularism
3. Separation of powers
4. The need for decentralization and elimination of discrimination
5. Preservation of the territorial integrity of the country
6. All-round development that is balanced and in line with social justice
7. The belief that the attainment of these goals is contingent upon the replacement of the current theocratic government with a government that is based on the will of the people (i.e., popular sovereignty in place of the current system of ‘Velayt-e-Faghih; or the so-called government of God represented by a cleric).

TWENTY

The experience gained in the aftermath of this seminar has demonstrated in no uncertain terms that constructive dialogue between moderates on both sides of the ‘ethnic question’ in Iran is beneficial for all parties, as it acquaints those traditionally in favour of a centralized system with the problems of discriminations (political, economic, religious and linguistic) experienced by people in peripheral and ethnic areas.

At the same time, it also makes those anxious in wanting to promote and defend the rights of people in peripheral and ethnic areas, in an atmosphere devoid of violence and instability, more aware of the challenging practical complications and impediments that need to be overcome for the realization of their aspirations. Moreover, it helps all parties to better understand  one another's sometimes different values ​​and concerns – something that can ultimately help the process of building trust as an important precondition for a peaceful and less costly transition to a better future outcome for all people in Iran.

[1] The seminar was also reminded that as there was no appropriate Farsi alternative for the term ‘sub-nation’, resort had been made to using the term ‘Meliat’ (ملیت) as the nearest substitute for sub-nation.

What Now in the Aftermath of Another Unexpected War in the Middle East?
by Dr. Mehrdad Khonsari

The surprise attack on 7 October by Hamas began on the last day of the current Jewish religious festivities, exactly 50 years and one day after the start of the Yom Kippur war of 1973 at which time the Egyptian armed forces crossed the Nile and took positions in the Sinai.

Like in 1973, the attack caught the Israeli nation and the IDF completely off guard with various intelligence organizations in Israel e.g. Shin Bet, Mossad and the IDF's military intelligence network - and all their various 'hi-tech' facilities including the much vaunted 'Iron Dome' air defence system completely off guard.

Moreover, the level of unprecedented casualties inflicted on the Jewish state as a consequence of this 'asymmetrical war' not conducted by national armies but by irregular militias - estimated at this time to be more than 900 dead, 350 seriously wounded and near death with more than 2000 wounded and dozens of men, women and children abducted and taken into Gaza - has been beyond any kind of previous expectations by Israeli leaders from all parties as well as the Israeli general public.

Yet, for the Israelis, reality has now set in and a huge mobilization process has been rapidly kick-started in order to deal with what is likely to be a protracted war for which there can be no quick solutions.

In this conflict which many influential circles see the invisible hand of the Islamic regime in Iran as having been an instrumental hand behind the planning of Hamas’s surprised attacks, the options that lie ahead for the Israelis consist mainly of the following:

⦁ The war remains mainly confined to Gaza between Israel and Hamas with limited fall outs in areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority, especially in locations such as Jenin where there has been a history of recent clashes between Palestinians and Israeli settlers as well as the IDF.

⦁ The war expands to include areas where well-armed Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as IRGC trained units in Syria also enter the fray by conducting missile and rocket attacks targeting nearby Israeli towns and settlements as well as certain further away major cities such as Haifa and Tel Aviv.

⦁ In the final analysis, if unchecked, the conflict has the potential for expanding from the immediate areas around Israel to include direct punitive aerial attacks against Iranian military targets including Iran’s nuclear facilities.

There is no question that any expansion of this conflict that might increase the geographic scope of the current military confrontation from Gaza to the shores of Iran will be directly dependent on the reaction of Iran and its regional proxies and their willingness in subjecting themselves to potential risks of existential threats.

What seems inevitable at this time is an Israeli ground attack against Hamas in Gaza following the ongoing concerted campaign of aerial bombing of suspected Hamas bases and military facilities. This task, which might entail a temporary re-occupation of Gaza, will probably be fully focused on disarming Hamas in the first instance while at the same time destroying its political and military leadership.

Although direct Iranian reaction has so far been limited to mere propaganda, its most prominent regional proxy Hezbollah has nonetheless engaged in some minor (in comparison to Hamas) missile and rocket attacks against Israeli facilities in and around the Lebanese border with Israel including the disputed Sheba Farms.

The key test for everyone monitoring the current situation, will be if Hezbollah attacks multiply by several folds once Israeli ground troops enter Gaza. Reaction to any strong attack from Hezbollah by the IDF would then undoubtedly result in a new full-fledged war (like in 2006) with Hezbollah in addition to Hamas, that could then potentially result in huge casualties - especially amongst the civilian population on both sides.

Iranian revenge attacks for Israeli aerial bombardment of IRGC facilities of the past several years in Syria through coordinated missile attacks against Israel from Syria, also has the dangerous potential of propelling a situation whereby the much-speculated scenario of an Israeli aerial bombardment of Iran - this time probably with US help and approval - with special emphasis on targeting Iranian nuclear facillties can actually become a reality.

As for the Islamic regime in Iran, they have in all likelihood been preparing for this scenario for some time, given the level of 'ready-made and in hand' propaganda material that came out on 7th October e.g. ready and available statements and posters distributed throughout Tehran and other places, all prepared in advance of the Hamas attack by the Iranian regime.

For the Israeli coalition government, the attack has now, for the time being, ended months of division within Israeli society. Reservists who had refused to show up before, have now all reported to their units upon having been called up.

Had Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu started any provocation despite rapidly rising tensions in the previous months, he would have been seen and accused by Israeli public opinion of starting a war to cover his internal shortcomings in face of the divisions arising from his government's policy of wanting to introduce judicial reviews.

However, with Hamas having started the conflict, Netanyahu’s hands are no longer tied and he leads a unified nation horrified by the serious atrocities already committed against Israeli civilian society - such as women and young girls being abducted and raped; children as young as 2 or 3 abducted and taken across the border and subjected to random beatings by hostile crowds and finally; men being killed and beheaded and then put on display.

There is even an additional hope that the surprise Hamas attack might lead to a situation whereby a new coalition or a government of national unity replaces the current right-wing coalition forcing the removal from office of extremists and highly provocative figures such as the current Finance Minister, Bezalel Smotrich and the National Security Minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir.

For the Palestinians and their long-awaited legitimate hopes and aspirations, it is difficult to speculate at this time what the future is likely to hold for the Hamas leadership, despite all their daring actions that have resulted in greater casualties being incurred on the State of Israel than any other previous conflict - something that no doubt will reverberate positively for them in the Arab world.

However, for the Palestinian leadership at large, in light of the gradual marginalization of the Palestinian causes first through the consummation of the Abraham Accords, which has since been followed up by the much expected signing of a possible new agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia which could effectively bring the 75-year-old Arab-Israeli conflict to an end without any consequential benefits for the Palestinian people, attacking Israel was a desperate act on the part of 'people who felt that they had nothing to lose'.

At the end of the day, while the Israel-Saudi rapprochement may be put on a temporary halt, the possibility that the entire Hamas organization might ultimately be forced to make an exodus similar to what the PLO did in 1982, this time by taking refuge in Qatar (or some other safe haven) may become inevitable in the not-too-distant future. Nonetheless, irrespective of what happens, the need for a new, credible and younger Palestinian leadership entering the fray and projecting a constructive way forward from the current chaos is bound to become more imminent than ever before.

Mehrdad Khonsari, a former Iranian diplomat, is a senior consultant
at the Iranian Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS).
10th October 2023

Iran’s Rattled Theocratic Dictatorship by Dr. Mehrdad Khonsari

For almost a month, spurred by the killing of a 22-year-old woman, Mahsa Amini at the hands of the country’s ‘Morality Police’, and miles ahead of all their counterparts in exile, tens of thousands of courageous people have participated in unprecedented protests against the theocratic dictatorship in Iran. The result has been the largest and most widespread wave of demonstrations against the Deep State headed by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his cronies since the inception of the Islamic Republic.

Championing the cause of secular democracy and end to a system of Gender Apartheid, Iranian women have led the popular uprising against the Mullahs and the despotic system of government they represent. Prominent in all the non-state-orchestrated demonstrations of the past 4 weeks that have in line with overwhelming national aspirations have repeatedly chanted the slogan, “Death to the Dictator” has been the conspicuous absence of any derogatory reference in any form or shape to either America or Israel.

Sadly, apart from Mahsa Amini, a number of other young teen age girls such as Nika Shakarami, Hadis Najafi and Sarinaz Esmailizadeh have also had to make the ultimate sacrifice in standing up for their beliefs, much to the grief of not just their immediate families but a watchful nation that has been so moved as never before by the courageous and selfless way in which they had made a stand for what they believed against overwhelming odds.

Perhaps the most consequential outcome of the current crisis brought about by the senseless brutality incurred on these young women as well as the many others who have been subsequently killed or arrested in their hundreds, has been the fact that the legitimacy of the Islamic regime in Iran has now been challenged as never before and irreparably damaged – something that has caught the attention of not just the public but many key policymakers around the world.

The headscarf being openly burned by thousands of women around the country today, represents universal opposition to the most visible symbol of oppression on the part of the Islamic Republic. These women rightly compare resisting the ‘compulsory Hijab’ to the fall of the Berlin Wall and they solemnly contend that just as the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of the end for Communism, widespread resistance against the Hijab could be the beginning of the end for the religious dictatorship in Iran.

It can be argued that ‘compulsory Hijab’ may indeed be the weakest of the ‘three ideological’ pillars (i.e., with ‘Death to America’ and ‘Death to Israel’) that keeps the corrupt and bloodstained Deep State afloat in Iran. Hence, the belief that forcing the regime to give way on the Hijab will, like the fall of the Berlin Wall, lead to the ultimate collapse of the entire edifice.

It is also important to bear in mind that for the past 12 months, the government of hard-line and highly unpopular President Ebrahim Raisi has been beset by a continuous string of public protests ranging from rudimentary issues such lack of drinking water or electricity shortages to unchecked rising levels of inflation and unemployment, for which his government has been incapable of providing any tangible solutions.

Uncertainties about Iran’s future economic prospects have also been exacerbated by behind the scene squabbling within the Deep State having to do with the question of succession to the current Supreme Leader at home and the continuing saga over Iran’s unresolved nuclear file and its impact on Iranian foreign policy abroad.

In an atmosphere where hard-pressed people have lost any vestige of hope for the system to reform itself, it is not surprising that the brutal murder of Mahsa Amini and the insensitive and brutal way in which the Deep State has reacted to public outcries, should have served as a catalyst for sparking the general reaction on the part of people who cannot envision a better future so long as the theocratic dictatorship remains intact.

While it may be too soon to write the obituary of the Islamic Republic at this stage, it does however, look very much like the beginning of the end for a universally-hated, despotic theocratic regime that has been clearly out of touch with a majority of Iranians – men or women alike.

It is hoped that freedom-loving people around the world and especially governments in the West should also seize this moment by focusing on practical ways of helping the courageous men and women of Iran who have bravely put their lives online.

Instead of harping on meaningless pronouncements such as more sanctions that have no immediate effect, democratic governments everywhere can try and come up with more tangible remedies capable of having immediate effects. To start with, they can begin by closing the twitter and other social media accounts of Islamic leaders, starting from the top, who are orchestrating the wanton suppression of defenceless people. If the removal of Donald Trump’s Twitter account can be justified, there is no godly reason why the same should not be applied to the Facebook, Instagram and Telegram accounts of Khamenei and his cronies in the Deep State.

More importantly, the West can put an immediate injunction on all the ill-gotten gains of Islamic officials and their families in Europe and North America – just as they did so quickly with the Russian oligarchs close to Putin – by cancelling their visas, freezing their bank accounts and impounding all properties under their names. These may be minor steps, but they can have profound psychological effect on those who are targeted and those who look up to them.

An old mentor of mine (former Foreign Minister, Ahmad Mirfendereski) used to say, ‘there are a thousand ways to say no but only one way to say yes”. The time has finallycome for the West to finally step up and show respect for the sacrifices that are being made by so many brave young Iranians for the promotion of freedom and democracy.

Mehrdad Khonsari, a former Iranian diplomat, is a senior consultant
at the Iranian Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS).
11th October 2022

One Target, One Demand: A United Consensus for Change in Iran

On 11th February, the theocracy in Iran celebrated the 43rd anniversary of a revolution that was to make Iran the cradle of modern-day Islamic fundamentalism.

The success of Khomeini’s populist revolution has to this day remained a source of great inspiration and popularity amongst many radical Moslems around the globe who have felt exploited and suppressed by decades of colonial rule as well as continued humiliation at the hands of Israel.

But for most Iranians, the experiences of the past four decades have been quite different: To start with, the initial state of euphoria that had accompanied the advent of an Islamic government was quickly replaced by one of huge disappointment. This was further exacerbated with the adoption of a new national constitution that was to incorporate Khomeini's personal doctrine of 'Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist', which flagrantly rebukes any notion of democratic rule based on popular sovereignty. Over the years, this betrayal of initial public trust has only been reinforced by poor governance, gross violations of human rights and national humiliation.

A Consensus for Resisting the 'Deep State'
With the election in June 2021 of Ebrahim Raisi, as president of the Islamic Republic, all three branches of government in Iran are for the first time in the hands of hard-line fundamentalists ideologically allied with the Supreme Leader, though together they constitute no more than a small minority of Khomeini's followers who came to power in 1979. Nonetheless, as a constituency, they and their supporters (senior officers in the Revolutionary Guards, senior radical clerics, various revolutionary organizations and charities with a dominating position in the country's economy), now increasingly referred to as the 'Deep State', have for a long time been in sole control of all the key levers of power and decision making including the security apparatuses and all forces of coercion in the state.

Allied with Russia and China and hostile towards the democracies of the West, the Deep State has gradually cast aside every shade of opinion that has called for transparency and reform. Senior political figures such as former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Moussavi and the former Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mehdi Karrubi who have been held under house arrest for more than a decade for contesting the falsified results of the 2009 presidential election, represent just the tip of an iceberg that stretches to many more senior leaders and their supporters who for reasons of caution have been much more guarded in publicly expressing their opposition to the way the country is being run.

These developments in line with the country's deteriorating economic circumstances for which the Deep State is incapable of providing any long-term solutions (even if an agreement to revive the JCPOA is reached) coupled with Iran's increasing estrangement with the West, provides a wakeup call for opposition forces to re-evaluate their failed strategies of the past, thereby positioning themselves in such a way as to pose a serious challenge to the Deep State. With a highly disgruntled public and ongoing daily protests around the country, the possibilities for meeting this challenge have never been better and the advent of Raisi provides forces of moderation and progress a narrow window of opportunity to promote an agenda for peaceful change under the banner of 'national reconciliation'.

By drawing lessons from other successful struggles such as the one in South Africa and avoiding the repeat of their own past mistakes in reading the mood of the Iranian people who have consistently displayed an aversion for any kind of violence or bloodshed, all political forces with a democratic orientation – including those former revolutionaries who have distanced themselves from the Deep State – can come together by focussing their efforts on just one target namely the Deep State, in pursuit of a single united objective: The establishment of a system that respects the will of the majority while protecting the rights of the minority - a feat that can secure mutual and peaceful coexistence for all – including those associated with the Deep State - through constitutional change.

Mehrdad Khonsari, a former Iranian diplomat, is a senior consultant
at the Iranian Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS).
24th February 2022

Raisi's First 100 Days: A Bad Omen for What Lies Ahead for Iran

After an uninspiring first 100 days in office, the future for Ebrahim Raisi, the handpicked choice of Ayatollah Khamenei to occupy the Islamic presidency in Iran, promises to be no less disappointing.

Indeed, at a time when his administration is in dire need of experts and technocrats to deal with the most basic of issues, such as the supply of fresh water and electricity to millions of deprived citizens, Raisi has instead surrounded himself with an inner circle of diehard ideologues whose only priority is the survival of the 'deep state' in Iran.

It has therefore surprised no one that in his first 100 days, apart from exaggerated sloganeering that has been accompanied by a mixture of threats and false promises, the Raisi administration has failed to come up with any kind of new and concrete policy – domestic or foreign – aimed at providing a measure of relief and improving the lot of the country's long-suffering people.

Having been elected in a process that was boycotted by more than half of all eligible voters and tainted by accusations of complicity in the murder of some 5,000 political prisoners in 1989[1] (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-57996483) that have seriously damaged his credentials with the West, Raisi also struggles with the reality that he and his cohorts are the inheritors of a series of hollow revolutionary slogans, such as 'Death to America and Israel', which they can neither pursue in a tangible way nor, more appropriately, consign forever to the dustbin of history.

In the sphere of foreign policy, Raisi's most immediate challenge will be the outcome of the planned indirect talks with the US aimed at trying to revive the JCPOA, known as the Iran nuclear deal, which many believe to be defunct and mostly irrelevant at this time.

From his perspective, without some kind of guaranteed and irrevocable agreement with the US, any hope of lasting sanctions relief and, more importantly, the flow of the much-needed foreign direct investment and technology transfers on which the revival of the Iranian economy must depend, will be a non-starter.

CROSSHEAD: Deal or No Deal?
After a five-month lapse in the talks in Vienna, Raisi's nuclear team, led by the deputy foreign minister, Ali Bagheri Kani – himself an ardent critic[2] of the 2015 JCPOA agreement (https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-new-appointments-foreign-ministry/31460305.html) – has finally agreed on 29 November as a date to meet. Trying to sound more self-confident and less flexible than the previous Rouhani government, Bagheri, who has been in discussion with his French, German and British counterparts, has been quite adamant that "nothing concrete can be achieved in the absence of the removal of all 'illegal sanctions'" in what must be an "agreement that is guaranteed to last[3]" (https://www.yjc.news/en/news/54557/bagheri-kani-an-agreement-to-remove-all-sanctions-effectively-is-out-aim-of-participation-in-vienna-talks).

As Iran refuses to include in the discussions any reference to its missile programme and regional policies – an important prerequisite for the removal of all key sanctions by the US (with behind-the-scenes goading from Arab and Israeli quarters) – it is hard to envision any kind of meaningful progress in the upcoming talks.

The Raisi government's only leverage at this time, in the absence of wanting to discuss non-nuclear related issues, is its offer to roll back actions that can be construed as going beyond the peaceful use of nuclear energy – such as the stockpiling of unacceptably high-grade enriched uranium – while removing all impediments to the monitoring of its activities by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors.

However, no one genuinely believes that, in the absence of wider discussions, there is any likelihood of a scenario where all sanctions will be removed. So the Iranian economy will continue to be hostage to these endless talks that will only address piecemeal issues such as 'which sanctions, which nuclear activities, and in what order' for the time being.

At home, while Raisi and the 'deep state' remain unchallenged by any kind of cohesive political alternative, the reality is that they are incapable of offering any kind of hopeful vision for the future of Iran that is palatable for the overwhelming majority of the alienated and hurting general population.

In this respect, it is ironic that the timing of Raisi's first 100 days in office should have coincided with the passing of FW de Klerk, South Africa's last head of state from the era of white-minority rule.

Just as de Klerk negotiated with Mandela to fully dismantle apartheid and establish a transition to universal suffrage, Raisi, who is tipped by many to succeed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as Iran's next supreme leader, could take a leaf from de Klerk's book by giving serious consideration to finding ways of embracing calls for national reconciliation and exploiting peaceful channels for transitioning away from the current theocratic dictatorship towards an all-inclusive system acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people.

It is worth mentioning that a pre-recorded video message[4] from de Klerk, apologising to the people of South Africa for the atrocities committed by the apartheid regime, was released last week[5] following his death (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QwL2NpgvKf8 – released after 11 November).

Raisi can either emulate de Klerk by working towards a peaceful transition through constitutional reform, or he could face the ultimate prospect of making his apology to the Iranian nation in front of a judicial tribunal.

Mehrdad Khonsari, a former Iranian diplomat, is a senior consultant
at the Iranian Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS).
22nd November 2021

Iran's 2021 Presidential Election: The will of the people or the 'Deep State'?

In a recent TV interview with BBC Persian, I was asked by the host to explain in simple terms how I would define the deep state in Iran. I responded that the deep state is a small unelected group of people who have seized a monopoly over every major lever of power in Iran.

Under the leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei, they are in charge of implementing plans and policies that are primarily designed to preserve the durability of the regime and cement their complete control over the nation. Under such a reality, the role of any elected official, to the presidency or to parliament, becomes nothing more than that of a 'contractor'.

In the past few years, a number of comprehensive studies (https://www.hoover.org/research/iranian-deep-state) about the deep state, and the decisive role played by unelected and 'behind the scenes' elements in Iran, were published by respected academic institutions[6] (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-america/2020-09-03/lessons-three-years-iranian-prison). They illustrate the existence of an intricate 'economic-security' apparatus with the clear objective of keeping power at any cost.

Many Iranians and more specifically, political and civil society activists, have for a number of years recognised this undeniable reality. However, for whatever reason, there has been no evidence of any defined, calculated or credible challenge to these deep state elements nor has there been any organised, cohesive and effective force that is capable of challenging this status quo.

Importance of the Upcoming Presidential Election
The question of Ayatollah Khamenei's succession is likely to feature prominently in the course of the next 4 to 8 years. A paramount concern of the deep state has been to engineer a situation whereby the outcome of the upcoming presidential election is able to ensure the future continuation of its dominance in the Islamic Republic.

Since many leading political personalities and organisations have, directly or indirectly, called for the boycott of the upcoming election, turnout will most likely be limited to those who see their interests in one way or another aligned with those of the deep state.

With the expected victory of a hard-line candidate, the deep state will arrive at a position whereby for the first time it will itself be in direct control of all three branches of government in the Islamic Republic.

This means that, for the first time in the 42-year history of the Islamic republic, they can no longer "pass the buck" and must instead assume direct responsibility for any future calamity that might befall the Iranian nation.

In such a scenario, with Ayatollah Khamenei having to perform multiple acts of "heroic flexibility[7]" (www.ft.com/content/33a7545c-249b-11e5-9c4e-a775d2b173ca) (a term he invented to justify his own climb-down in 2013 by allowing the original JCPOA negotiations to begin), the government will either achieve an acceptable compromise with the US for removing sanctions, or Khamenei will once again find himself vetoing any further talks.

In either event, in the absence of any contractors, it is he and no one else who will stand accountable to the Iranian people, and it will be incumbent upon him to explain why it is that he and his followers are powerless or incapable of meeting the basic needs of a despondent and Corona-ridden nation.

Either way, what little is left of his credibility will come under close scrutiny in an unprecedented manner, not just by the suffering masses in Iran but also by the force of global public opinion.

The Gradual Ascendence of the Deep State
The election victory in June 1997 of Mohammad Khatami over Ali-Akbar Nategh Nouri, the hand-picked candidate of the Supreme Leader, heralded the start of the 'reform era'. More importantly it exposed the divisions within the ruling establishment, which over time had also alienated the general public. Iranians had become increasingly resentful of the way in which the country was being led and administered.

The Supreme Leader made use of the reform movement by riding on its popular wave. Various reformist advocates, knowingly or un-knowingly, allowed themselves to be used as 'contractors' in the service of the deep state.

Many saw the election of Mohammad Khatami as a turning point and the beginning of a new chapter in the process of relations between the people and the state, a trend that for a short time was clearly and positively evident.

However, it soon became abundantly clear that talk of reform would be permitted as long as it did not in any way infringe upon domains retained exclusively for the deep state[8] (e.g., IRGC Commanders letter to Khatami, https://irandataportal.syr.edu/irgc-commanders-letter-to-khatami).

Today, 'hardliners', 'principalist' or 'the hard core of the regime', are those who control all the key political and economic levers, and who on the pretext of militant anti-Americanism have gradually directed the nation's leanings towards Russia and China. These represent only a small fraction of the constituency that brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power in 1979.

With the passage of time, the influence of many high profile 'insiders' has gradually declined, following increasing differences with 'behind the scenes' figures running the deep state.

A simple glance at the fate of two previous presidents of the Islamic Republic, Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (whose children have openly alleged[9] (https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-46720364) that their father's death had not been due to natural causes) and Mohammad Khatami (whose presence in meetings has been banned[10] (https://apnews.com/article/51b41481b23941bb8b207a0f359ff395)), point to this reality.

Even Ali Larijani (former 'Majles' Speaker) was humiliatingly disqualified[11] (https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-larijani-presidential-election-/31303831.html) from participation in the 2021 presidential election. Another previous Speaker (Mehdi Karrubi) and a former Prime Minister (Mir Hossein Moussavi) have been held under house arrest without trial for more than 10 years[12] (iranintl.com/en/iran-human-rights/iran-green-movement-leaders-mark-ten-years-under-house-arrest)). All this clearly points to a high level of dissent within the ruling establishment.

Eight years after the election of Hassan Rouhani, the real winner of the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections in which more than 70% of eligible voters participated (as opposed to a projected turnout of around 35% in the forthcoming election, notwithstanding regime manipulation of the figures) was none other than Ayatollah Khamenei and his cronies.

They skilfully distanced themselves away from the disgrace and fiascos associated with the Ahmadinejad era and by deliberately blocking any new contacts with the US months prior to the American withdrawal from the JCPOA agreement, they connivingly condemned the likes of Rouhani and Zarif to inevitable failure, thereby inflicting serious and potentially irreparable damage to the credibility of all moderates or reformists in the country.

The Antidote to the 'Deep State': 'National Reconciliation'
It is an undeniable reality that until such time as an organised and cohesive force emerges, in line with the aspirations of the people and capable of challenging the deep state, there can be no hope of changing the status quo.

At the same time, most Iranians, having witnessed the terrible outcomes of so-called efforts to establish 'freedom, human rights and democracy' in some neighbouring and nearby countries, are reluctant to attach themselves to any spontaneous action that might ostensibly expose them to greater domestic instability, violence and conflict.

In such a situation, and in view of previous experiences, the safest option for promoting change (something that no election in the Islamic Republic can secure), in an atmosphere free from revenge and violence, is to embrace and promote 'national reconciliation'. This entails engagement by progressive forces in a serious effort to try and replicate the movement which reached its climax 27 years ago in South Africa.

It is worth noting that what transpired in South Africa forced a much more cohesive government, to retreat and remove itself from the seat of power when confronted by the will of the overwhelming majority of its people – an effort that was also supported by the international community.

For the deep state in Iran to ultimately arrive at a decision similar to what transpired with the Apartheid regime, it is essential that all regime officials be offered assurances of immunity as well as guarantees that neither they nor their families nor their rights as Iranian citizens would be endangered or threatened at any time in the event of a peaceful transition.

In other words, they would never be treated in the manner in which they themselves executed, pillaged and exiled their vanquished starting in 1979.

To achieve this outcome peacefully, it is possible to fall back once again on the proposal (first promoted some 16 years ago by a number of respected political and intellectual personalities) to hold a free, un-manipulated and decisive "referendum" in order to amend the current constitution and bring its provisions in line with current realities (i.e., empowering the people and giving them the right of self-determination). This is similar to the recent suggestion of leading reformist candidate, Mostafa Tajzadeh, whose candidacy for the upcoming presidential election was rejected.

Moving forward beyond the upcoming election, no matter who the victor may be, adoption of a movement under the banner of national reconciliation also provides the least costly antidote for persuading the deep state to step back and submit to the will of the overwhelming majority of disenchanted Iranians who seek nothing more than to reshape and enhance their future through peaceful change.

Mehrdad Khonsari, a former Iranian diplomat, is a senior consultant
at the Iranian Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS).
18 June 2021

Iranian Hardliners 'Engineer' Parliamentary Elections in a Show of Defiance

The sparsely attended Parliamentary elections to the 11th 'Islamic Majles', and elections to the 'Council of Experts' charged with electing the next Iranian Supreme Leader, were conducted in a sombre atmosphere on 21st February, and inevitably yielded the exact results they were orchestrated to produce.

With moderate and progressive elements represented by the Rouhani government hugely discredited for 'over-promising and under-delivering', especially since the re-imposition of harsh U.S. economic sanctions in the aftermath of America's withdrawal from the nuclear deal, the overwhelming triumph of anti-U.S., hard-line conservatives generally opposed to the nuclear deal was preordained.

The only unexpected factor was the unprecedented level of manipulation on the part of the Khamenei camp to eliminate the presence of all dissenting voices either in parliament or more importantly in the Council of Experts, which is expected to play a crucial role in the forthcoming succession battle.

In an election marked by the lowest participation level in the 41-year history of the Islamic Republic (42.5% overall with only 26% in Tehran province), the Guardians Council -- charged with vetting the credentials of candidates on the basis of their commitments to the tenets of the Islamic Republic as prescribed by the current Supreme Leader -- had earlier ensured a conservative landslide championed by radical hardliners, by rejecting the credentials of more than 7000 reformist candidates wanting to contest seats in 290 districts around the country. In the end the reformist presence of 140 was reduced to 19 with the conservative hardliners increasing their representation to 220 (with 40 independents and another 11 seats being decided in the second round).

Many in Iran had foreseen such an outcome as far back as May 2018, when President Trump first sealed the fate of the reformists by pulling the US out of the nuclear deal, and more recently sanctioning the killing of Ghassem Soleimani. Ironically, Trump's unilateral exit from the JCPOA, and his harsh sanctions policy referred to as 'Maximum Pressure', not only strengthened Iran's hardliners but thwarted U.S. attempts to secure a 'new and better deal' that addresses key additional issues such as Iran's so-called 'malign behaviour in the region', or its ambitious long-range missile programme.

Nonetheless, notwithstanding U.S.frustrations at the impasse, the fact remains that the Iranian nation, owing to Khamenei’s intransigence, is losing revenues equivalent to 150-200 million dollars per day. Although ordinary Iranians might take some solace at their narrow escape from a full bloodied and devastating war with the U.S. -- a war they could not have hoped to win -- they fully realise their leaders are incapable of solving the root causes of their daily sufferings through rampant inflation, unemployment and corruption, for which the new conservative majority has no remedy other than brutal repression.

Finally, at a time when the Islamic leadership is critically engaged in a struggle to decide the succession to Ayatollah Khamenei, there is a disturbing development that parallels the pattern and behaviour of the emerging radicals in the conservatives' camp with those previously exhibited by the National Socialists in Germany.

Just as 'National Socialism' a century ago was the ideology of far right groups in Germany that blended fervent anti-Semitism, anti-communism and opposition to the Versailles Treaty along with utter disdain for liberal democracy and a regulated parliamentary system, the increasingly isolated segment of the ruling establishment under Khamenei is attempting to replicate that model of monopolising its hold on power by ensuring that only those committed to its radical agenda (anti-liberal, anti-American, etc.) are in control of every key institution in the country. Hence, efforts to manipulate parliamentary elections and, more importantly, elections to the Council of Experts, are a deliberate attempt to sustain and prolong a rule that has achieved nothing more than 41 years of political mismanagement, social mayhem, economic chaos and international isolation.

In order to pacify a populace drained of religious fervour, the emerging radicals -- perhaps best labelled as 'Iranian neocons', who now constitute a majority in the Iranian parliament, have resorted to adding a tinge of nationalism (e.g. the right to enrich uranium) to their otherwise unpopular agenda, which is nothing more than a loose set of beliefs based on a minority held view of Shia Islam.

Those watching Iran closely expect the same 'Iranian neocons', whose small and diminishing support base nonetheless constitutes the only truly organised political force inside Iran, to try and railroad their chosen candidate to yet another electoral victory in next year's presidential election. At the same time, no one -- including some of their newly elected MPs such as former Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, tipped to be the next Speaker of Parliament -- has the slightest belief that they are capable of resolving any of the country’s chronic problems, especially the economy, without ultimately readjusting their positions and arriving at some form of a compromise with the other political factions they have actively sought to dislodge from any decision-making process in the country. In the absence of such an accommodation, and the attainment of some form of a compromise for lifting sanctions and providing economic relief, the available alternatives promise nothing less than further upheaval and violence at home, and potentially another damaging all out war.

While dissatisfaction with the status quo is the only thing that unites most Iranians, it is clear that the manner in which the recent elections were conducted was viewed as a charade by an overwhelming majority of despondent Iranians who simply chose to ignore the whole process.

As 'Iranian neocons' celebrate their moment of victory following the recent elections, they are nonetheless aware that nothing has been resolved and a tortuous path awaits their every future move. Ultimately, it is in their interest and that of the Iranian nation to see a 'road map' capable of promoting national reconciliation through dialogue, as amplified most recently by the likes of President Rouhani and former President Khatami, to mobilise a popular and inclusive movement realistically capable of ending Iran's endless quarrels with the outside world, resurrecting the economy and most importantly, healing civil society.

Mehrdad Khonsari, a former Iranian diplomat, is a senior consultant
at the Iranian Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS).
February 2020

Iran Under Siege and Minus Soleimani

Will 2020 be a year of Conflict or Compromise?

The plight of ordinary Iranians and Iran’s worsening economic woes for 2020 will undoubtedly become hugely compounded as the political dust settles following of the unexpected killing of Ghassem Soleimani, the Commander of the IRGC’s ‘Quds Force’ by the American military in Iraq. Adored and admired by many, hated and feared by some not just in Iran but also throughout the region, next to Ayatollah Khomeini, Soleimani was probably the only other generally popular and respected Iranian political figure since the inception the Islamic Republic 40 years ago.

Despite the heated rhetoric generated by a variety of leading figures, Soleimani’s death has come at a time when any potential retaliation on the part of Iran might come at a very high cost to a regime already facing unprecedented domestic challenges and popular unrest due to its rapidly declining economic circumstances propelled by American sanctions.

While Tehran may have various potential options and many surrogates for venting its revenge, it is also acutely aware that additional escalation could drag the country into a high-risk conflict with a powerful enemy it can never defeat.

The strike on Soleimani will in the short term, harden popular sentiment against the US while simultaneously shoring up the regime. With parliamentary elections planned for 21 February, the death of such an iconic figure will no doubt provide the regime with a fortuitous opportunity to manipulate public sentiment in order to try and boost electoral participation on the pretext of solidarity when most pundits were predicting a low turn out at the poll due to widespread public anger and disillusionment with both the Rouhani government as well as his hard-line conservative critics who are expected to take control.

Likely Break in Diplomacy
Events of the past several weeks culminating with the death of Soleimani will for the time being bring all quiet diplomatic efforts aimed at a attaining a new deal to a halt. Nonetheless, without any ground breaking diplomatic breakthroughs either at the regional or international levels, another year of very bleak economic prospects coupled with greater political uncertainty confronts the Iranian nation, given the government’s inability for offering any serious remedies for counterbalancing the harsh and crippling effects of the US economic sanctions.

Although public attention may for a time be distracted by generally shared sentiment for the loss of Soleimani, failure to find any kind of a solution for ending the current economic debacle at home will not remove prospects of further even domestic unrest. All evidence suggests that the seriously stunned hard-line leadership under Khamenei will not hesitate to unleash every means at its disposal for crushing any defiance. They will also be more guarded than ever before to prevent further public agitations from becoming a tool in the hands of foreign intelligence services anxious for reaping the domestic benefits of the inevitable vacuum that has now been created with Soleimani’s demise. Although it is expected that the regime will try and extend Soleimani’s period of mourning into a public display of support for itself and its anti-American policies, but no one truly expects such manoeuvrings to distract the public away from their unattended and legitimate demands once the initial hype surrounding his death comes to an end. But despite all its problems that have now become more exacerbated by new challenges posed to its legitimacy in the region, it would be wrong to assume that the Islamic leadership in Iran is on the verge of collapse, especially as it faces no organised or cohesive opposition either inside or outside Iran.

The brutally crushed public protests of November 2019 had cut across socio-economic, communal and ethnic divides at a time when Iran was facing other serious domestic challenges due to the increasing divide that has taken place between the Supreme Leader and his cronies (senior figures in the IRGC, the Judiciary and the intelligence community), and other previously loyal and compliant personalities from both the ‘Reformist’ and the more conservative ‘Principalist’ camps. Soleimani’s death will no doubt provide the regime with a moment of solace when all forces unite together in condemnation of ‘the vile action’ that has taken place. However, once the mourning period has come to an end, internal challenges to Khamenei’s style of leadership will undoubtedly resume with a new vigour in the absence of such a critical and loyal personality on his side.

Moreover, in the past several months, internal threats to the ruling establishment in Iran have also been further augmented by the prolonged anti-government riots in Iraq and Lebanon with a pointed anti-IRI dimension – believed by many Iranian leaders including the late General Soleimani to have been ‘conspired’ by a combination of elements from the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia, all intent on frustrating Iran’s so-called ‘hegemonic ambitions’ in the region.

While the assassination of Soleimani has now exploded into a new round of open recrimination and confrontation between the U.S. and Iran - this time with renewed pressures on continuing US military presence in Iraq, there are signs that all sides, including the unfortunate Iraqi government and people forced to bear the brunt of an Iran-US proxy war being waged on their soil, do not want matters to get out of hand and result in further bloodshed.

War or Peace?
Shrewd and experienced as Khamenei is, it cannot be excluded that behind a defiant façade he ends up opting for what he once depicted as “heroic flexibility” as a prelude to nuclear negotiations in 2015. Indeed, he knows only too well that the deteriorating economic situation in Iran cannot be alleviated as long as the US sanctions are in force, and he understands the reality that US sanctions cannot be removed without some kind of a dialogue and an acceptable compromise with America.

Whether he will stick to his defiant position by accelerating Iran’s departure from the JCPOA or opt for a policy of de-escalation by allowing for previous ‘back channel’ approaches with both Saudi Arabia and the US aimed at achieving some form of an acceptable modus vivendi to be restarted remains to be seen. Indeed, despite angry rhetoric and heated passions, it is still quite possible for mediation from a number of trusted and tested parties may gradually lead to some form of quiet de-escalation based on a mutual understanding that at the end of the day, there is nothing to be gained for either side in the event of any intensified confrontation or all out war.

Until such time as he is forced to yield, the Supreme Leader will, nonetheless, continue basking in his ideological aversion to all manner of rapprochement with the US, much to the delight of his hard-line constituency.

Finally, it is important to note that all of Iran’s current challenges are happening at a time when the Islamic leadership is quietly but critically involved in a struggle to decide the future of succession to Ayatollah Khamenei as the next Supreme Leader. In this campaign, for which Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, is considered to be a leading challenger, each competing side tries most poignantly to frustrate any point scoring efforts on the part of their opponents, such as arriving at a do-able arrangement with the US. Although, succession is a battle that is set to continue well beyond 2020, potentially reaching its climax by the time of the next presidential election in 2021, once again the demise of Soleimani is bound to greatly affect its eventual outcome by enhancing the chances of those seeking serious change and a different outlook for the future of Iran.

Mehrdad Khonsari
05 January 2020

War is no solution to the US-Iran standoff

While tensions between Iran and the US reached new heights in the aftermath of recent explosions, shooting down of an American drone and the seizure of a British tanker in the Strait of Hormuz and the waters of the Persian Gulf, both parties are well aware that war cannot settle the outcome of their disputes.

For its part, the Iranian leadership understands only too well that it can never defeat the US in any military conflict. But, it is also fairly confident that the US will never resort to deploying the kind of military options that is needed to force regime change in Iran. In the absence of such a will on the part of the US, any aerial bombardment, no matter how damaging, will only result in a situation whereby the dominance of elements more hostile to the US inside the country is enhanced.

For the US, given the effectiveness of its sanctions policy, any incremental gain from military action that does not lead to regime change is simply disproportionate to the potential costs involved in deterring or preventing possible asymmetric Iranian retaliations against the US or its allies around the world.

Hence, nothing other than direct talks can offer a prospect whereby Iran may overcome its economic woes and the US can reach a more comprehensive agreement with Iran that includes issues not covered in the JCPOA. Although the current standoff between Iran and the US may deteriorate even further, both parties are acutely aware that ultimately, talks are unavoidable even in the aftermath of any escalation that might entail needless destruction and loss of life.

The challenges ahead
For Iran, the priority at this time is to try and revive the country’s sagging economy by dealing with crucial issues such as economic growth, unemployment, runaway inflation as well as the protection of its national currency. None of these issues can be addressed until such time that US economic sanctions are removed, allowing Iran to freely export its oil while striving to attract unimpeded flows of much needed foreign investment and new technology.

Thus, contrary to assertions made by some hard-line quarters in Iran, what remains to be worked out is not whether Iran will ever engage with the US, but rather when and under what circumstances will direct talks be convened. One downside in any such calculation which must be guarded against, is the dangerous prospect being contemplated by some self serving radicals whose gut reaction in face of inevitable negotiations, is to precipitate some form of limited military exchange with the US at this time, believing that Iran’s bargaining power is bound to wane with time due to the damaging effects of the sanctions.

What must follow
While President Trump, having pulled out of the JCPOA, has repeatedly indicated his willingness to “make a new deal” with Iran, it is becoming gradually more clear that a beleaguered Iranian leadership is also reconciled to engage in a dialogue, which would then evolve into some form of a face-saving mechanism for meaningful negotiations. However, they are adamant not to replicate the US-North Korea format, which has produced nothing more tangible than a ‘photo-op’.

Although the Iranians would ideally prefer the unlikely prospect of knowing the exact contours of a final deal prior to any engagement, it would be incumbent on the US to amend or suspend some of its maximalist demands as well as lifting the gratuitous restrictions it has placed on the person of the Iranian Foreign Minister.

In the recent past, mediation efforts to broker direct talks on the part of countries like Oman or the Japanese Prime Minister who visited Iran in June have failed to obtain the approval of the Iranian Supreme Leader. Because of increasing tensions in the Persian Gulf region, it may now be possible that another ‘honest broker’, perhaps this time in the shape of the French President, Emmanuel Macron, who is expected to visit Iran before long might succeed in breaking the current deadlock.

Ultimately, Iran will need to display signs of flexibility that could potentially lead to a situation whereby some of the arrangements arrived at in the JCPOA are expanded to include other key issues such a mutually acceptable range for Iran’s missile forces as well as certain compromises that might help put an end to the humanitarian disaster in Yemen while in reciprocity recognition is given to some of Iran’s legitimate interests in places like Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

Unlike times when the US administration may have been influenced by persistent lobbying from the ranks of regional states like Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the reality is that at this point, their role is likely to be hugely diminished as the US will need to make its own calculations in light of the costly set backs some of its recent policies have suffered in the region.

Since 1979, militant anti-Americanism has played a pivotal role in preserving power for the highly unpopular fundamentalist faction in Iran. Confronted with unprecedented economic pressures applied by an equally hostile American administration that threatens not just their ‘raison d’être’ but their very survival, there is an emerging realization that nothing short of a ‘grand bargain’ with those they have consistently demonized in the past 40 years – regardless of all its possibly huge domestic ramifications - can reverse the current economic ‘nose dive’ which is the most immediate priority for containing public unrest and preventing social instability inside the country.

Mehrdad Khonsari
15 August 2019

A Letter from ICPS to All Members of the ‘Islamic Majles’

As tensions have escalated between Iran and the United States, some national figures form both inside and outside the country have warned the authorities in Tehran of the potential dire consequences of this continuing crisis. They have urged senior members of the ruling establishment to pursue efforts to turn the current climate of crisis into one of opportunity for the attainment of a honourable and effective settlement with the United States.

At the same time, 225 civil and political activists (inside and outside the country), have urged the government to embark upon ‘new diplomatic initiatives with the aim of ending the current crisis’. The signatories, despite their differences over other issues, are united in their views that negotiating with the United States is not a sign of weakness tantamount to surrender, but an urgent and necessary step for bringing to an end a damaging saga, the cost of which over the past 40 years has been borne by the suffering people of Iran.

Part of their message states:

"The people of Iran are now suffering from the overwhelming strains of poverty and unemployment as well as the escalating costs of living and are extremely worried about the outbreak of an unwanted war. People in neighbouring countries also share these fears. Everybody knows that when diplomacy ends, war begins. The people of this region have bitter memories of war, destruction along with all its economic, social and human consequences. The Persian Gulf region has in the course of the past months become a powder keg ready to explode in the event of a single spark that may arise from any miscalculated action”.

A number of Majles Deputies (members of parliament), such as ‘Ali Motahari’ have also voiced their objections, complaining that the Majles has neither been briefed or consulted on all matters relating to this all important issue that is at the heart of the recent crisis.

On the other hand, Abdul Ali Bazargan (the son of the first prime minister of the Islamic Republic and national religious figures), Kourosh Zaim (member of the Leadership Team of the ‘Sixth’ National Front) and Mehrdad Khonsari (former diplomat and Head of the Iranian Centre for Political Studies (ICPS) in London), have in separate letters to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic called for a change in the direction of Iran’s foreign policy.

A letter recently sent to all Iranian MPs by ICPS in London, has also emphasized that "neither the pursuit of the past objectives nor insistence upon carrying out tried and tested methods of previous times is likely to produce an effective and acceptable outcome for protecting and promoting the national interest of the Iranian nations."

The full text of ICPS’s letter to the MPs is as follows:

Dear Members of the Islamic Majles of Iran

After respectful greetings,

The letter before you is testimony to the serious concerns and anxieties that have engaged the minds of so may patriotic Iranians, owing to the dangerous political and economic situations confronting our beloved country at this time. It is their wish to see how they can be of service of their country in order to prevent the current crisis from becoming more exacerbated. It is for this purpose that they have turned to members of the Majles, who are gathered from all corners of our country to defend and protect the national interests of our country.

You are no doubt aware that the International Monetary Fund (a source often referred to by senior members of the Iranian government) has predicted a negative economic growth rate of minus 6% along with 50%-plus inflation for the year ahead. This places our nation amongst some of the least developed countries in the world. Quite apart from the mid-term costs of such a prediction upon the standing of our economic system, the serious consequences such a situation is likely to have for ordinary people can in no way escape your attention.

It is a fact that that the economic sanctions and other aggressive policies pursued by the United States and its allies have played a major role in bringing our country to its present predicament. But what is unclear is the role that must be played by the Honourable Members for the purpose of containing this crisis. Some quarters are of the view that for reasons of solidarity and patriotism, and for reasons of preventing divisions that might even compromise the territorial integrity of our nation, the only recourse is to stand firmly behind the ruling establishment. But it is evident that mere statements of support or passage of resolutions, that may be of some propaganda value, are by themselves incapable of helping the regime in any meaningful way. On the contrary, it is by standing up against repeated mistakes, unwise decision-making and needless provocations that the regime as well as the security of our nation can best be protected against our foreign enemies.

Today, even some parties with ideological convictions close to key decision makers are quite vocal in their acknowledgement of increasing public grievances due to increased poverty, social inequality and rampant corruption. However, while failing to offer any meaningful solution to these issues, they take solace by simply blaming outside elements for all these problems.

The current crisis encompasses many knots in the domestic and foreign policy arena that have become seriously entangled, and no resolution to our existing problems can be found until such time as these knots have been properly untangled. The Honourable Members can thus acknowledge that, in the absence of such a process, efforts to circumvent sanctions or to encourage people to bear greater endurance in face of increasing hardships are incapable of achieving the solutions we seek.

On the domestic front, when certain elected dignitaries such as the current and a former president (Rouhani and Khatami) had spoken of the need for ‘national reconciliation’, perhaps they had somehow foreseen such times when no major national crisis could be resolved in the absence of national solidarity – times when no officials or their families could feel safe or secure from the wrath of circumstances borne out of divisions and eliminations. Indeed, what is transpiring before us in places like Algeria and Sudan, irrespective of the differences that exist in our circumstances, should serve as clear warnings of what may also transpire in Iran.

In the sphere of foreign policy, the pursuit of dialogue, not for purposes of dealing with a limited agenda aimed at servicing immediate needs, but for dealing with some of Iran’s long term issues that have for decades remained unresolved to the detriment of our economic prosperity and contrary to what is claimed to be our national dignity, is a cause for which much courage and bravery is needed.

In these circumstances, is anyone better placed than the Honourable Members of the Majles, who have been entrusted with protecting the dignity and interests of people from every corner of our land, to step forward and accept the challenge and the mantle of boldness?

Indeed, some members of the Majles should in this regard take solace in the words of the Founder of the Islamic Republic, who had spoken of the “primary role assigned to parliament” in presenting their arguments, and by exerting needed pressures on those ‘key players within the system’, so that our country may be extricated from the current dire crisis.

In normal circumstances, ‘consensus building’ is an art in diplomacy that results in reducing tensions while increasing trust and credibility that bears fruit when the security, well being and prosperity of our country is enhanced. However, in the present situation, when all doors to discussion remain shut, opening new channels of communication for purposes of consensus building is no longer a diplomatic art but a political necessity for saving the country. This is at a time when a number of serious political leaders and movements inside the country have in a variety of ways spoken of the need for opening new channels, and have reiterated the need for consensus building and national reconciliation more than ever before.

You, as responsible parties with access to sensitive news and developments, know better than most how certain domestic and foreign warmongers are waiting for an opportunity to drive our nation towards a conflict with incalculable consequences such as the possible disintegration of Iran. For such parties, the present situation provides the best opportunity to fuel and provoke a situation they have been hoping for.

Should a disastrous outcome befall our nation in the absence of responsible action from the Honourable Members, no justification will prove acceptable to your constituents, and any subsequent expressions of regret will not make any difference.

It is incumbent upon you not to let this state of affairs lead to a situation whereby the long-standing anger of the people is allowed to manifest itself in the shape of chaos and rebellion, and perhaps even lead the country to another period of despotism. It is important that you learn from the contemporary history of Iran and the Third World, and prevent already tested and bankrupt policies from being repeated. It is further a legal and religious obligation on your part, as elected representative of the people, to focus on preserving and protecting the interests of your constituents and not those of any individuals. We wish to remind you that the continuation of previous paths, reflecting tested and failed policies, is neither desirable nor acceptable.

Paying attention to the above points, that have been raised with benevolent intentions, will also encourage silent parties amongst the Iranian community abroad to rise and direct their credibility and resources in the direction of helping to save Iran from the current situation.

It is our hope that the Honourable Members of the Islamic Majles will step forward at this critical juncture and initiate a new direction for Iran before the people pass any final judgement on them.

The Iranian Centre for Policy Studies
London, Spring 2019

After 30 years in Power - A Recap
Approximate English Translation of Mehrdad Khonsari’s
Open letter dated 22 May 2019 To Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei

With greetings and hopes for a proud and prosperous Iran.

The worsening crisis with the U.S.A., along with rapidly deteriorating economic circumstances at home that have made life more difficult than ever before for our people, has prompted me to candidly draw your attention to certain critical issues.

Soon, 30 years will have elapsed from the time of your ascension to the position of ‘Supreme Leader'. I am hoping that, despite the various important responsibilities and high offices you have occupied in the course of the past 40 years, you have not forgotten your previous experiences as an ordinary citizen in the years prior to the revolution. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind the intensely felt sentiments of many people, with deep roots in our country, who have witnessed with great disquiet the unending cycles of distressful calamities that continue to seriously threaten the future destiny of our nation (even in any non-war scenario) – albeit without any imminent danger to the survival of your regime.

My experiences and observations in previous years of outside powers – Eastern, Western or regional – have reinforced in me the solemn belief that the best path forward for bringing to realisation the required evolution for the future progress and well being of our nation, can only come by way of meaningful dialogue. This must be allowed to take place amongst differing political forces inside our country. The maintenance of stability and security as well as the provision of a conducive circumstance for protecting the future of our upcoming generations is in desperate need of new approaches, which if unobstructed, can save our people and our nation from the terrible consequences of various intrigues being planned against us in some quarters.

In light of current realities, the truth is that neither your performance in running the state, nor that of the motleyforces opposed to you, has been very successful in advancing the required solutions for badly needed changes. However, if failure on the part of your opposition has resulted in their loss of influence and credibility before the Iranian people, the result of your wide ranging failures have resulted in nothing less than widespread poverty and loss of hope for the masses at home, coupled with wanton confrontations and isolation abroad.

Today, with the intensification of American sanctions, as well as projections by the IMF of a 6% economic contraction and an over 50% inflation rate for the year ahead, your pontifications on the need for a ‘resistant economy ‘ is now showing its efficacy. This strategy promoted by you has not only resulted in failure and complete loss of credibility for the Rouhani government but, more importantly, has managed to utterly shatter the hopes and aspirations of millions of ordinary Iranians, who have desperately longed for a better future for themselves and their families. Indeed they had looked forward to a post-JCPOA future in which they could see an end to a variety of crises, which have in the course of the past 40 years brought so much havoc to their lives. Today, your vision in this regard has become a reality with ordinary suffering people having to bear its entire cost.

Another consequence of your action in the aftermath of the nuclear agreement, when you prohibited the government for holding further talks with the United States, was the loss of an opportune and fortuitous moment that could have led to a gradual conclusion of other outstanding disputes - disputes that have become exacerbated because of an endless and tiresome campaign of anti-US sloganeering that has worked solely to the disadvantage of our people in the last 40 years.

Today, with the advent of a new administration in Washington we have witnessed its withdrawal from the JCPOA and the start of a full-fledged psychological war against our country, boosted by a re-imposition of crippling sanctions. Despite all claims made to the contrary by various officials, rising pressures at this time have left our country with only two options: War, with its terrible consequences, or submission to dictated negotiations.

In one of your talks during the course of the negotiations leading to the JCPOA, you specifically made reference to the need for the removal of all sanctions and asserted that your acceptance of Iranian participation in those negotiations had been because of that need. Today, in an atmosphere so much more poisoned against our country, with regional enemies resorting to heavy expenditures for lobbying American officials to punish and bomb our country, is there any other real alternative to sitting down and submitting to a diplomatic process capable of delivering an honourable outcome for our country? The consistent undermining of the Rouhani government by quarters close to you, in the aftermath of the successful conclusion of the nuclear deal. has led to a situation whereby, in order to prevent the possibility of unimaginable damages being inflicted on our nation, you can no longer suffice by indulging in a tactic that you previously called ‘heroic movement’. This time nothing short of a major ‘acrobatic move of Olympic proportions’ on your part will suffice.

Mr. Khamenei,
I will let you be the judge concerning the overall performances of the various governments under your aegis, and their records of achievements in securing development and improving the future prospects of our people - especially in comparison to our neighbouring countries, let alone the likes of South Korea with whom we competed at the time of the revolution.

I will also add that in the course of the previous 30 years since assuming the mantle of ‘Supreme Leader’ - contrary to your own initial set of stated ideals, and contrary to your own statement about your eligibility to the very session of the Council of Experts that elevated you to your present position, you have ostensibly come to somehow accept the very same ‘divine trust’ that had previously been ‘gifted by the people to the person of the Shah’.

It is interesting to note that, while in the course of the previous 30 years, people have at no time had the possibility of voicing any opinion concerning your status, nonetheless, whenever awarded the possibility of participation in any free and uninhibited voting process, they have consistently elected candidates that have stood the furthest distance from you. It is a fact that by implying such a notion, all such candidates have been successful in attracting the full support of ordinary citizens.

Despite the fact that such a process had led to dangerous levels of social and political fragmentation, nonetheless, you have even opposed the notion of ‘national reconciliation’ – a concept strongly advocated by the present President of the Islamic Republic (Rouhani) and one of his predecessors (Khatami). Sadly, some of the monopolist tendencies entrenched around you, oblivious to the eventual consequences of rising levels of hatred on the part of ordinary people, have sarcastically reacted by saying that “we are not at odds with anyone favouring reconciliation”!

However, the truth remains that prior to any reconciliation with the outside world, that is bent on incurring all kinds of damage to our nation, we are in need of reconciliation and harmony with one another. Contrary to the past, and by learning from history that can repeat itself, it is incumbent on you to try and help promote the process of national reconciliation. At a time when many are looking to a future beyond your life time, by following examples set by the likes of Franco in Spain or De Klerk in South Africa, you can also help prepare the groundwork for the establishment of a future order that is truly representative of the will of the Iranian people. You can help start a national debate by encouraging participation from a wide range of groups of highly respected, qualified, thoughtful and trusted personalities who can transform the present atmosphere of ‘exclusion’ into one of ‘inclusion’.

Mr. Khamenei,
The Founder of the Islamic Republic had responded to a warning issued by his compassionate ‘Deputy’ (Ayatollah Montazeri) on the subject of ‘historical judgment’, by saying that “our love should be directed towards God and not history.” However, I am hopeful that you will remain cognisant of the fact that “love of God” neither validates the endangering of people's lives or the future of our nation, nor is it a substitute for moral responsibility on the part of those who lead. In reality, responding to history is responding to the present and future generations who will ultimately pass judgment on any omissions that are made with regard to those moral responsibilities.

Therefore, before it is too late, lend your support by taking a giant step that can divert the current crisis, before it goes astray, into an opportunity for attaining unity and solidarity in our nation. Do not forget that some form of peace and reconciliation ultimately lies at the end of any conflict.

By taking note that history has in the past shown itself to be unforgiving to regimes far more consolidated than yours, it follows that instead of entrusting the future destiny of Iran into the hands of cronies and a number of trusted ‘Sardars’ (revolutionary guard generals), you should instead opt for seeking a substantive solution that is capable of promoting and protecting the current and future interests of our nation.

Mehrdad Khonsari
London, 22/05/2019

Bullying Iran Will Not Work

While Iran’s regional adversaries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia along with some Iranian opposition groups may feel encouraged by President Trump’s psychological war against Iran symbolized by his rejection of the nuclear agreement and the re-imposition of US sanctions, they are, somewhat less certain about his end game. This is due to the fact that US policy on the one hand hints at promoting regime change in all but name while on the other, it seeks to pressure Iran for talks regarding a new ‘deal’, which would ostensibly make regime change redundant.

Signals from Washington are probably equally confusing for the Iranian authorities. While it is easy on the one hand for all parties to unanimously dismiss American ‘maximalist demands’, there are no doubt serious divisions at the highest levels on the subject of engagement with the US. While some senior figures, concerned with the deteriorating state of the Iranian economy and its resultant effect on the lives of an already restive population, seek new ways for ending Iran’s 40-year old estrangement with the US, others led most crucially by the Iranian Supreme Leader are convinced that any such rapprochement would initiate a process whereby their domination of the Iranian state could be irrevocably reversed.

With Russian, Chinese and European backing in every feasible way, the Islamic regime is more than likely to withstand US pressures for at least the remainder of Trump’s current term. By violating the nuclear deal, instead of isolating Iran, the US administration has in fact isolated itself. Also, failure on its part to in any way alter the status quo in Iran in the next several months is more likely to seriously dent the administration’s own credibility as it prepares for the upcoming presidential elections.

At the regional level, it would also be a mistake to miscalculate Iran’s capabilities for fending off US led pressures aimed at curbing its power and influence. Apart from being one of the most stable countries in the Middle East, it is a fact that no final outcome for the various existing regional conflicts can be attained without explicit Iranian cooperation. If anything events in the past few years ranging from the tacit breakup of the GCC and the surreal behaviour of Saudi Arabia and UAE in Yemen and their efforts to overpower and intimidate smaller Gulf countries like Qatar, have only helped to solidify and strengthen Iran’s position in the region. Recent events such as the grotesque murder of Jamal Khasooghi and the absurd military adventures of the UAE in wanting to expand its so-called ‘military presence’ to areas as far away from its tiny homeland as the Horn of Africa, have in the eyes of many regional players exonerated Iran and legitimized its actions.

US sanctions will almost certainly affect the lives of ordinary citizens in Iran who are the most obvious victims of a contracting economy plagued by hyperinflation, rising unemployment and unchecked corruption. However, it does not necessarily follow that a disgruntled public will have the capacity for implementing the kind of political change sought by Washington and its regional friends - especially in view of the fact that the Iranian regime is not isolated as before and enjoys open support from Russia, China and the EU.

Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom, many regional states are themselves weary of any major change in Iran that results in a situation whereby they are overwhelmed by a fortified and arrogant Saudi State, which is perceived by countries like Oman and Qatar to be a more dangerous irritation. Similar considerations also apply to Iraq and Turkey with whom Iran enjoys wide economic ties and broad consensus on a number of key ethnic and sectarian issues.

A More Constructive Approach
Instead of pointless bullying, it is more prudent for all parties wanting to see positive change in Iran to focus more on the genuine disagreements that currently exist over a number of key issues among the Iranian ruling establishment and most notably the subject of engagement with the US. Today, there are many senior officials who have come to the conclusion that Iranian national interest dictates that the whole question of Iran-US relations be revisited on the basis of current priorities and not events that transpired more than 40 years ago. Opposed to them are smaller groupings under the thumb of the Supreme Leader and in possession of almost all the key levers of real power in Iran, who see uncompromising hostility towards the US as the best camouflage for protecting their power and their ill gotten gains from corrupt and unchecked practices.

Instead of exploiting these differences, US grandstanding that makes no distinction between potential friends and hardened enemies only incites various political rivals inside the ruling establishment to work together against a common existential threat.

While there are clear limitations to what the US can do, the process for positive and peaceful change in Iran – such as ‘national reconciliation’, which can only be orchestrated by Iranians themselves can nevertheless be advanced if US narrative was adjusted in such way to be more in ‘synch’ with realities on the ground and not simply restricted to hostile and at times highly exaggerated denunciations.
 

Iran: A Future Beyond Trump and Khamenei

The introduction of the latest round of US sanctions against Iran has for the time being played into the hands of the Iranian Supreme Leader and his followers who see the protection and extension of their dominant status in Iranian politics being contingent to a policy of continued hostility towards the US and some its key regional allies.

It is no secret that Ayatollah Khamenei was previously anxious to end the nuclear dispute for purposes of easing the terrible effects that the biting multilateral sanctions were having on the Iranian economy. However, he was never in favor of trying to augment the agreement that was subsequently concluded with the ‘5+1’, and especially the US government, as a stepping-stone for resolving Iran’s other contentious issues with the international community.

Thus instead of using JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) as a precursor for further agreements, Khamenei deliberately instructed the Rouhani government to desist from any further diplomatic interactions with the US and began championing the cause of a ‘Resistant Economy’ that would ultimately allow Iran to remain self reliant and thereby defiant, no matter how much pressure was applied against it by any “unreliable American government”.

Thus, instead of helping to widen Iran’s options in the international arena by reducing the country’s dependence on self serving ‘economic hegemons’ like China for Iran’s much needed economic growth and development, the Ayatollah’s engrained hostility towards the US only succeeded to sabotage and discredit the Rouhani government and derail its efforts aimed at reviving Iran’s much damaged economy.

Some of Khamenei’s hardline supporters fearful of any change that might jeopardize their control over key levers of power in Iran expediently interpret President Trump’s unilateral decision to withdraw from JCPOA in face of general international condemnation as evidence of the Ayatollah’s foresight and sagacity. But, much as in the case of Saddam’s Iraq, only ordinary citizens and not the ruling elite are likely to bear the full repercussions of the Ayatollah’s intransigent policies.

While US sanctions and other bullying measures may in the context of the next 12-24 months fail to make any significant impact in altering the current situation in Iran, there is no question that continued economic hardship could inevitably lead to social tensions and instability with seriously unimaginable consequences.

It is thus in the best interest of all political actors in Iran to try developing a framework that looks beyond the kind of self indulgent antics currently being dished out by both Ayatollah Khamenei and Donald Trump.

It is obvious that such an outcome cannot be achieved so long as Iran remains in a state of un-declared all out war with the US and some of its key regional allies.

But looking to a future beyond both Khamenei and Trump – a scenario devoid of sloganeering and maximalist demands that could conceivably be with us as soon as the next 2-3 years - there is no reason that a reasonable compromise capable of settling all outstanding issues between Iran and the US resulting also in the removal of all sanctions against Iran could not be worked out.

Ayatollah Khamenei has led the country in a manner that has undermined the hard earned diplomatic achievements resulting in JCPOA and has subjected the Iranian nation to a fate that offers nothing more than wanton suffering and needless sacrifices.

The time has come to pursue a different path to salvage a secure and prosperous future for the Iranian people. This can be achieved by pursuing national reconciliation at home – i.e. promoting peaceful change through dialogue and compromise amongst all the key constituencies – and pursuing a course of non-confrontational and effective diplomacy abroad. Such a combination can provide an outcome that is consistent with protecting Iranian national interest and the well being of ordinary citizens while also replacing regional and international tensions with mutually beneficial economic and political cooperation.

Special ICPS Report: Potential Impact of Resumed Sanctions On the Iranian Economy

Iranian hardliners, led by the Supreme Leader, were unwilling that the Rouhani Government should follow up his government’s successful negotiations following the signing of the JCPOA in July 2015 with further agreements with the US on other issues, though it was clear that the sanctions that were removed at the time pertained only to the nuclear issue and nothing else (i.e. terrorism, human rights etc.).

The Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and his advisers have in the interim period further exacerbated matters for the Rouhani government by insisting that all efforts be concentrated towards the imposition of what they have labelled a ‘Resistance Economy’ in place of a growth oriented, prospering economy that had been promised by President Rouhani and supported by the people on two separate occasions (i.e. presidential elections of 1993 and 1997). By curbing the efforts of the Rouhani government to increase its outreach to the West (and in particular the US), Khamenei and his hard-line constituency were essentially consigning the Iranian economy to a fate that would encounter severe difficulties in terms of dealing with such issues as employment, production, inflation, investment and ultimately the value of the national currency. While mainly indifferent towards Europe, a consequence of their action was that they knowingly created a situation whereby the Iranian economy would inexorably become reliant on partners such as China or Russia, both of whom being incapable of fulfilling Iran’s long-term economic needs and future ambitions.

The election of Donald Trump further exacerbated matters. While movement on the flow of much needed capital and technology was from the very outset seriously impeded (contrary to the spirit of JCPOA) by the Obama administration, the emergence of Trump and subsequent US exit from the JCPOA in May 2018 has created a situation which, if unresolved by November 2018, could lead to further social and economic upheaval inside Iran augmented by continuing increasing levels of public unrest and general protestations.

With Europe, China and Russia unlikely to be able to counterbalance American opposition, the Iranian economy will in the coming months face serious trouble in the absence of a broader deal that includes the US. While Trump has left the door open for ‘unconditional negotiations’, the Iranian regime, nonetheless, continues to remain reticent (despite obstinate third party mediation) about initiating a new ‘taboo breaking’ session of dialogue with the US.

President Rouhani has also been forced to change direction in order to retain a semblance of credibility (this time with open support from ‘hard-line’ quarters) though his actions have failed to make any impact. His resort to changing key personnel such as the governor of the central bank account for nothing, as nothing will change until such time that a new approach with the US has been worked out and slogans such as ‘death to America’ have been officially discarded.

This is undoubtedly the gravest crisis that has confronted the Islamic regime in the past 40 years and unless the Islamic Republic can react in a meaningful way – especially in its approach towards the US (as well as attempting to reach some kind of a regional compromise with Israel), the ruling establishment in Iran will have to confront what will be nothing short of a most serious existential threat.

Nature of the Upcoming Sanctions: 90-Day Sanctions and 180-Day Sanctions

Following its withdrawal from the JCPOA, the US stated that it would allow a maximum of up to 180 days amnesty for foreign companies that had resumed their economic activities with Iran in the aftermath of the nuclear agreement to disengage from their activities thereby avoiding US fines or other counter-measures that might be employed against them.

1. As of 7 August 2018, the first series - i.e. ‘90-day sanctions’ were resumed affecting the following areas:

• The Iranian Government’s purchase of US dollar banknotes;
• Iran’s trade in gold and other precious metals;
• Direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer to or from Iran of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals like aluminium, steel, coal and software for integrating industrial processes;
• Significant transactions related to the sale or purchase of Iranian Rials or the maintenance of significant funds or accounts of Rials outside Iran;
• Iranian sovereign debt;
• Iran’s automotive sector.

Moreover, other authorisations under the JCPOA will also be revoked, including the import of Iranian carpets and foodstuffs to the US as well as special licences for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services.

2. As of 5 November 2018, the second and more substantial series - ‘180-day sanctions’, affecting key areas like shipping, oil, banking and insurance will be resumed affecting the following areas:

• Iran’s port operators, and shipping and shipbuilding sectors, including the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), South Shipping Line Iran, or their affiliates;
• Petroleum-related transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), and National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), including the purchase of petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products from Iran, plus Iran’s energy sector;
• Transactions by foreign financial institutions with Iran’s Central Bank and other designated Iranian financial institutions;
• The provision of specialised financial messaging services to Iran’s Central Bank and other designated Iranian financial institutions;
• The provision of underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance for transactions with Iran.

Additionally, The ‘Office of Foreign Assets Control’ (OFAC) has stated that non-US persons who are still owed payment under written contracts which were concluded prior to 8 May 2018, and which had complied with sanctions regulations at the time of delivery or provision, may still receive payment under the terms of their contracts even after the expiry of the 90-day or 180-day wind-down period (as applicable). Such payments could not involve any US persons or US financial system, unless they are exempt or have been explicitly authorised by OFAC.

As part of the January 2016 sanctions relief, certain Iranian entities which had been on the US ‘SDN’ List(1), including the likes of NIOC and NITC were removed from the SDN List, but put on the EO 13599 list(2), which meant that US persons and foreign entities which are owned or controlled by US persons could not deal with them, but other entities were able to deal with them. Such positions will also be reversed by 5 November 2018 (the end of the 180-day period), with OFAC putting the relevant entities back on the SDN List. This will mean that non-US persons who engage in activities with these entities become exposed to the risk of infringing US secondary sanctions.

Potential Impact of Resumed Sanctions on the Iranian Economy

Resumed sanctions, in simple terms, can impact Iran’s already highly damaged and perennially mismanaged economy in the various areas listed below:

1. Infrastructure projects will come to a halt (already has) thereby creating lack of new capacity for production of electricity, crude oil, natural gas, water desalination, telecommunication, railroad and metro expansions and modernizations, etc. The reason is that foreign engineering companies and contractors will not be bidding for any project in Iran. It is they who can provide the newtechnology and know-how to design and build these projects. This will seriously affect the creation of new production and services and new employment capacities;
2. New machinery will not be sold to Iran, thereby not allowing Iran to create new production capacity to meet increasing demand for products. Also, import of certain types of raw materials, essential for domestic production will be stopped, thereby not allowing Iran to continue the smooth production of goods consumed generally in the domestic market;
3. Foreign banks, especially the large international ones who have presence in the US, will refuse accepting payments from Iran and sending payments to Iran. Also, foreign banks will refuse to lend money and credit facilities to Iran in order to facilitate trade (export and import). These are key facilities that are desperately needed;
4. Foreign investors will refuse investing (desperately needed for the creation of new production and employment capacities);
5. Foreign Export Guarantee Agencies will refuse issuing insurance cover for projects and loans to Iran.
6. The Iranian government, which claims to currently hold up to 100 billion dollars in deposits outside Iran, is unlikely to use those reserves in order to assist local producers with imports of goods. It will possibly keep those reserves for other plans outside Iran;
7. Foreign companies offering specialised services will refrain from offering those services to Iran - i.e. insurance and reinsurance, engineering companies, management consultants, ICT services (information and communications technology), software companies, financial services and the like, which will have a knock on effect for the creation of new service and new employment capacities.

A consequence of the combination of a lack of new investments, cash flow shortages, lack of new machinery and parts as well as a lack of raw material on the Iranian economy will inevitably result in the following:

1. Shortage of goods and services resulting in higher prices because sellers can no longer replace the goods and service at their disposal/inventory;
2. Higher prices will result in high overall inflation for the country, which will eat into people's already low income, thereby making them poorer;
3. Higher prices will also act in a chain affect making all related goods and services more expensive. This is likely to create a vicious inflation cycle;
4. Those companies that cannot produce enough goods due to the shortage of raw materials will be forced to layoff people since they do not have the income/cash to pay them indefinitely;
5. The consequence of increase in unemployment in any society ultimately leads to strikes, demonstrations and social unrest (as witnessed in recent weeks);
6. Goods produced in Iran (e.g. agricultural products) will automatically become subject to higher prices due to more expensive transport services (e.g. fuel) as well as a general perception about higher demand and lower supply.
7. The doubling of foreign exchange rates against the Rial, which, in part, was due to institutions and individuals seeing the sanctions coming, has already impacted import prices. Imported goods in the past 9 months have doubled in price much to chagrin of domestic consumers.
8. All animal feed and pharmaceuticals and all human pharmaceuticals produced in Iran rely to a great extent on theimport of base products (generic). The price of imported pharmaceutical products has already been seriously affected by the rise in the value of foreign currencies against the Iranian Rial.
9. Finally, some opportunistic elements will aggravate the current dire situation for the ordinary citizen by taking advantage of these bottlenecks in the economy through hoarding of their products (in the hope of increasing their future profits) and essentially allowing for ‘Greed’ to exacerbate matters by entering the price-rise cycle.

Immediate Prospects

The figures for Iranian trade in the period from 21 March to 22 July of this year (compiled by Iranian energy and economics analyst Faezeh Foroutan - source cited in footnote 3) show China and the UAE jointly accounting for 39.8 percent of Iranian imports and 37.8 percent of its exports. By comparison, nine members of the European Union, including heavyweights Germany, France and Britain shouldered only 15.5 percent of imports and 7.93 percent of exports.



American pressures to reduce Iranian oil exports to ‘zero’ post November 2018 has already received a major setback given China’s refusal to cut back its Iranian oil purchases. However, it is expected that Iranian oil exports to Europe, Japan, South Korea and India will be sharply reduced as a result of US pressures. The only measure of slight comfort for Iran has been a rise that has taken place in the price of crude oil in recent months.

Iran, nonetheless, in response to a series of measures initiated mainly by Abu Dhabi (encompassing Iranian business activities in the UAE as a whole (i.e. Dubai) has sought to shift its export hubs to Qatar and Oman and strengthen economic ties with Russia(3). However, these measures are incapable of providing the comfort that is sought by Iran in the shorter term.

Finally, Europe’s ability and willingness to play its part in salvaging the nuclear deal was called into question by the new German financial rules and could depend on whether the Brussels-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) bows to US threats if it fails to exclude by November Iranian banks from its global financial transfer system.

As matters stand, in the absence of serious change in Iran’s disposition towards the US (and by implication towards Israel in the region), there is no short-term remedy for tackling Iran’s current economic crisis. The bottom line is that Iran needs to enter into a discussion that will address all its quarrels with the US, if American initiated economic sanctions are to be removed. It is obvious that in the absence of any bi-lateral negotiations (that can consume a great deal of time), Iran will not be able to reestablish meaningful economic relations with partners it is eager to work with, especially in Europe, for the reconstruction of the Iranian economy.

In the interim period, with the unlikely prospect of any meaningful EU package to blunt the effects of US sanctions, according to a recent report(4), the United Arab Emirates (not Abu Dhabi but Dubai and Sharjah), and China are likely to offer Iran some solice against the impact of harsh sanctions. According to the same report, Russia and Oman rather than Europe are emerging as runners-up in possibly enabling Iran to circumvent or cope with the sanctions.

Conclusion:

Unprecedented pressures resulting from the collapse of the Iran’s national currency, the Rial (having lost more than 50% of its value in the past 6 months) coupled with increasing levels of public protests against worsening economic circumstances, have seriously dented the credibility of the Rouhani government. Forced into addressing the Iranian nation (on national radio and TV) with the purpose of calming the population, Mr. Rouhani’s charge that the US was waging “a psychological war against Iran” and other remarks are not expected to have any significant impact. This is due mainly to the fact that, for the time being, he is in no position for providing any tangible solutions to any of Iran’s serious dilemmas that range from improving the economic situation, holding direct talks with the US to soliciting support from the ‘4+1’ (i.e. EU3+China and Russia) for circumventing the effects of US sanctions. Rouhani indicated some hope that prior to the imposition of the second (more serious) round of US sanctions in November, talks with EU and other leaders in Europe and at the UN General Assembly in New York might lead to a situation whereby some of the current pressures are lifted.

(1). As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such individuals and companies are called "Specially Designated Nationals" or "SDNs." Their assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them. Click here for more information on Treasury's Sanctions Programs.
(2). List of Persons Identified as Blocked Solely Pursuant to Executive Order 13599 (E.O. 13599 List).
(3). Dr. James M. Dorsey (senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture), “Can the US make Iran sanctions stick?”, 4 August 2018.
(4). Ibid.

Can Iran Turn Crisis into an Opportunity?

In the face of unprecedented US hostility buoyed by a host of regional adversaries like Saudi Arabia and Israel, the ruling establishment in Tehran needs to tread cautiously if it is to manage what is potentially the greatest existential threat it has faced since its inception in 1979. The choices before them are simple: Continue as before and risk greater economic hardship, more internal unrest and possible military conflict; Or provide instead through dialogue and engagement, real possibilities for economic recovery and a final end to Iran’s international isolation.

In a difficult ride that has endured one crisis after another, the Islamic state has successfully managed not just to retain total control at home but to extend its influence as a powerful regional player. Yet, its economy is in tatters and the gulf between ordinary people and the regime in general and its hardline ideologues in particular has seriously widened with the passage of time.

Following President Trump’s announcement to withdraw from JCPOA and to reinstate previously removed sanctions, earlier promises to revive Iran’s ailing economy by creating jobs, curtailing inflation, salvaging the national currency and promoting over all prosperity by resolving the ‘nuclear dispute’ seems little more than a fading mirage.

Although the European signatories of JCPOA along with Russia and China have remained faithful to their commitments so long as Iran remains compliant to its obligations, the reality is that the scale of investments and technology transfers needed by Iran is simply beyond their grasp in face of persistent US opposition. The French President, Emanuel Macron, has been quite succinct in pointing out the reality that no European government can force any major private entity to risk jeopardizing its US operations for the sake of doing business with Iran.

The situation was further exacerbated when Mike Pompeo sent a 12-point ‘set of demands’ to the Iranian leadership - telling them amongst other things to give up Iran’s ballistic missile program, end all enrichment activities and cease involvement in every regional country it is currently involved in. Expectedly, his message was immediately rebuked by Ayatollah Khamenei and countered by Iran’s own ’15 point demand list’ as later announced by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif.

Yet somehow, irrespective of the current toxic atmosphere, the possibility for a potential ‘new deal’ with Iran has deliberately not been blocked by no lesser figure than President Trump himself. This was made abundantly clear in the tail end of his speech removing the US from JCPOA and repeated in more precise terms during the course of his press conference with the visiting Japanese Prime Minister in early June. This flexibility suggests that much like his earlier hard rhetoric against North Korea, the US President in concert with a responsive Iranian leadership could be a willing partner to once again confound everyone by squaring the circle.

Such a supposition would suggest that any initiative for exploiting possibilities for a more comprehensive ‘deal’ capable of meeting Iran’s broader expectations must now come from the Iranian leadership. Anticipating the urgent nature of this matter, some 100 well known Iranian political and social activists have signed an open letter demanding that direct negotiations with the US should now be actively pursued. While this call has been strongly rejected by hardline quarters close to Ayatollah Khamenei, the spirit of their message has received a positive response from a number of senior advisers close to President Rouhani.

Responding to this challenge while strategically strong in the region, is an obvious advantage for Iran’s bargaining position in what one Iranian journalist has dubbed as the on going “public negotiations’ following the ‘maximalist positions’ that have been advanced by both Pompeo and Zarif. The alternative, in the event of added altercations leading to further diplomatic discord and possibly military confrontation with the US, would in all probability weaken Iran’s bargaining position and play more directly into the hands of its regional competitors such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. Such an outcome in concert with continuing domestic protests, could lead to seriously detrimental consequences not just for the ruling establishment but also for the country.

The Iranian leadership has never been in a better position – i.e. given the existing level of international irritation with the Trump administration - for advancing its arguments for a more comprehensive new deal following America’s withdrawal from JCPOA. It is ironical that Iran stands to potentially gain a great deal more than an alternative scenario that would have had the US in the agreement but still obstructing the resumption of normal economic ties between Iran and the rest of the world.

It is now incumbent on Ayatollah Khamenei in particular to respond in support of Iranian national interest by not obstructing the start of direct Iran-US talks with the clear purpose of reaching a durable agreement that no longer leaves Iran reliant upon partners incapable of meeting its crucial economic needs. While President Rouhani’s pragmatic government might be amenable to such an outreach, it is those self-serving quarters associated with Khamenei who grudgingly continue to label any rapprochement with the US as a betrayal of the Islamic Revolution.

The hard-liners conveniently forget that while serving as President, Khamenei never opposed either repeated purchases of military equipment from Israel during the Iran-Iraq War nor the invitation that was extended to Robert McFarlane to visit Iran in what later became infamously known as the ‘Iran Gate’ scandal. At the time, pragmatism, not ideology was at the forefront of Khamenei’s consideration, much like the flexibility he later displayed over the nuclear issue when he allowed the Rouhani team to strike the JCPOA deal with the ‘5+1’.

Obstinate rigidity on the part of Khamenei in current circumstances can prove lethal both at home and abroad, while direct dialogue with the US can potentially lead to a situation that might avert economic uncertainties, domestic instability , external humiliation and regional chaos.

While Iran – just as the US - will undoubtedly have to make some concessions for reaching a durable compromise– similar to those made by countries like China, Vietnam and Cuba, each with their own past history of hostility with the US, the gains it can make are significant and well capable of bringing to realization the ambitious hopes of many patriotic Iranians for the future of their country.

Iranian leaders need to appreciate that for the foreseeable future, Europe, China and Russia are incapable of circumventing the US in meeting Iran’s urgent needs. Moreover, they need to realize that either buying time or becoming reliant on countries like China and Russia simply for purposes of counterbalancing the US, quite apart from its limitations, is hardly in the long-term interests of the Iranian people.

Mr. Khamenei, in light of America’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal, may be permitted to take some solace in having previously warned against “not trusting the Americans”, but it is a fact that as matters develop, only he will be held responsible for any harm that should befall upon the Iranian nation as a consequence of his intransigence in allowing for new talks.

1st May 2018.

Europe Has A Duty To Protect The Nuclear Deal

What is at stake when President Trump announces his decision on 12 May to stay or part with the ‘JCPOA’ (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) involves not just reopening old wounds and the renewed threat of proliferation in the Middle East, but also the prospects of another costly war in the region. What is also disturbing is the fact that an inexperienced American president should defy consensus opinion not just amongst his closest international partners but also amongst his own foreign policy community thereby subjecting regional and international security to wanton risks.

It is ironic that the rise of ‘Iran Hawks’ in the US decision-making process should happen at a time when ideological radicals are but a minority in Iran’s ruling establishment with very little public support. While Trump’s persistent threats to renege on America’s signed obligations has been a god sent gift for reviving the fortunes of Iranian hard-liners, they have at the same time frustrated the economic promises of the Rouhani government and compromised his reformist agenda before millions of hopeful Iranians.

The leaders of France and Germany have in recent weeks tried to persuade President Trump to look for new ways of augmenting the JCPOA while remaining faithful to a signed agreement that also includes Russia and China. While President Trump – perhaps eager to flex some muscles in advance of his impending talks with the leader of North Korea, remains ambiguous about his final decision; it is quite possible that in the end he will refrain from completely rejecting the JCPOA.

However, from an Iranian standpoint there continues to be a huge gap between what had been promised and what has actually been delivered by the JCPOA. In reality, while President Rouhani is struggling to retain public support by attracting foreign capital and technology in order to resuscitate the country’s suffering economy, what is being discussed by Iran’s Western interlocutors is at best clinging to an agreement which has not been fully implemented or at worst the prospect of new sanctions and ‘add-ons’ in lieu of scrapping the agreement altogether. It is no wonder that Ayatollah Khamenei, who has repeatedly voiced his distrust of American intent, should feel vindicated leaving such figures as Foreign Minister Zarif who had successfully negotiated the JCPOA in the lurch for having naively succumbed to a series of broken promises.

It is now incumbent upon Europe - in line with imitative recently proposed by the French president - with Russian and Chinese support to put matters right. Honouring the commitments made under the JCPOA – an agreement confined entirely to the nuclear issue – does not mean that there are no other areas of contention between Iran and the West such as Iran’s missile program or its activities in the Middle East. However, it is only right that they should be addressed in separate formats, independent of JCPOA.

Providing Iran with incentives to remain inside the JCPOA in face of repeated US badgering, it will be possible for Europe to negotiate for a more comprehensive deal that includes extending the duration of the agreement. With regards to Iran’s missile program or its often referred to ‘bad behaviour or malign influence in the Middle East’, again all these issues can be raised provided due recognition is also given to all of Iran’s legitimate defence and security considerations as well as other priorities. For example, the independent European Central Bank or Central Banks within some key European countries may be induced to finding ways of bypassing continued American banking obstructions (in violation of JCPOA) by lending directly to companies willing to engage with Iran.

It is well to remember that no local or outside power currently engaged in the Middle East can claim to have a monopoly on ‘good behaviour’. The carnage and instability in Iraq or Afghanistan or the on going civil war in Syria or the calamitous state of affairs in Libya were not instigated by the Iranian regime. Indeed the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria along with funding for radical Sunni elements who have callously murdered innocent civilians in the streets of Europe and America have been a product of bad behaviour on the part of some of the West’s closest allies in the Middle East who are now lobbying the US as well as Israel to start a new war with Iran.

For its part, while it should remain faithful to the JCPOA, Iran also needs to understand that due to some of its past activities and current provocations, it continues to remain exposed to all kinds of allegations and at times unwarranted accusations. Its only tangible success in having extended its influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and the corridor which it provides to the Mediterranean, if anything has been a consequence of American failures in these arenas. Iran, which can potentially exploit certain economic benefits from such an opening, has simply filled the vacuum left by miscalculated interventions on the part of the US and its friends. Nonetheless, there is a huge volition on the part of all the losers in the Syrian equation to dispossess Iran of its gains and dislocate its influence from the region.

Finally, Trump’s continued robust criticisms of the nuclear deal in collusion with other anti-Iranian claims and provocations sponsored by the likes of Saudi Arabia could also serve as a catalyst for another potentially explosive situation in the Middle East sparked by an all out ‘intended’ or ‘accidental’ conflict between Iran and Israel on Syrian soil with unpredictably catastrophic consequences.

Europe in tandem with Russia and China must now act to avoid further conflict in the region by helping to preserve the JCPOA and the credibility of those who negotiated its passage with or without the US.

1st May 2018.

Relinquishing the ‘Moral High Ground’ to Iran

President Trump’s belligerent approach in muddying the water with Iran is yet another ploy to remain true to populist promises he made to right wing audiences – at home and abroad - in the course of his 2016 campaign for the White House.

However, despite all his rhetoric, what remains obscure at the end of the day is what is to be gained by ‘decertification of the nuclear agreement’ and how such a move is likely to chastise Iran while enhancing US or Western interests?

The truth of the matter is that since the ratification of the nuclear deal in July 2015, Iran despite having complied with all its obligations, has continued to suffer from persistent US obstructions that have essentially prevented international banking and financial institutions from actively participating in what is generally believed to be the world’s largest foreign investment market. Hence, all ‘antics’ aside, the only real difference in US position vis-à-vis Iran is that while the Obama administration made promises that it did not keep, President Trump intends on passing the buck to Congress so that it can then re-impose the kind of robust measures, which the Treasury Department under his predecessors had never removed.

What is even more unclear is how exactly the pursuit of such gratuitous belligerency which could potentially result in the cancellation of the nuclear agreement benefit the US, its allies and the cause of non-proliferation at a time when all parties are engaged in a serious crisis over international security with North Korea. Trump’s message is clearly in contradiction to positions enunciated by all senior military officials as well as his key cabinet members who have spoken on the record about the need to honor the commitments which the US has made in conjunction with Russia, China, France Britain and Germany to the nuclear agreement that has also been endorsed by the UN Security Council.

Moreover, Trump’s actions in this regard will not even satisfy regional players such as Israel or Saudi Arabia who see this empty and inconsequential gesture on the part of the US President as a ploy for not living up to the kind of expectations he had created in advance of his election. In the case of Israel, such a ploy that is incapable of making any material short to mid-term difference to Iran’s overall strategic disposition in the region, is hardly any compensation for not moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem or openly validating Israeli settlement policies in the occupied territories. For Saudi Arabia, Trump’s ‘bad mouthing’ of the Iranian regime in the absence of any direct military action against Iranian targets, falls way short of the kind of US support that would help resurrect their fortunes from the downward spiral of their bankrupt policies on Yemen and Qatar while Iran consolidates its position in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

There is no question that Trump’s exacerbation of a situation that hinders the flow of capital and investments needed for economic reconstruction into Iran will seriously affect the lives of millions of ordinary Iranians who had hoped that on the back of the nuclear agreement, the road would be paved for further agreements with the West that would assist Iran’s complete rehabilitation and reintegration into the world community.

Sadly the Iranian people’s overwhelming support for the re-election of Hassan Rouhani in the recent presidential election in face of hardline elements bent on frustrating his moderate and progressive agenda, is being rewarded by policies and pronouncements that enhances the position of only those who want to emulate the North Korean model in dealing with the US.

In the final analysis, any move to dismantle the nuclear deal will not have the support of world public opinion or that of any of the other major signatories to that agreement. It will only relinquish the high moral ground to Iran, leaving the US as the isolated party.

Dr. Mehrdad Khonsari is a former Iranian diplomat and a Senior Consultant at the ‘Iranian Centre for Policy Studies’.

Less Iran - Bashing And More Dialogue, Please

The alternative spells bad news.

The anti-Iran rhetoric employed by self-serving politicians in the US, mostly aims to cash in on years of built up anti-Iranian sentiments amongst their general public. There is no question that the Islamic regime bears a great deal of responsibility for this precarious situation due to more than three decades of provocative and at times militant behaviour. Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that this situation has been seriously reversed since the departure of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the advent of the Rouhani presidency in 2013.

While many senior world leaders have embraced Iran's new disposition, the same cannot be said of the US, where "Iran bashing" continues to remain a choice option for enhancing one's domestic popularity.

The resulting change in Iran's demeanor has already reduced a major source of international tension as well as Iran's isolation in the aftermath of the nuclear agreementthat was concluded with the '5+1' in July 2015. While many senior world leaders have since embraced Iran's new disposition, the same cannot be said of the US, where "Iran bashing" — under whatever circumstance — continues to remain a choice option for enhancing one's domestic popularity. This kind of disingenuous behaviour on the part of many leading American politicians continues despite "known" realities such as the fact that neither Iran nor any Shiites have ever been involved in any fatal terror attacks carried out in America or Europe. At the same time, these leaders remain solemnly silent about the fact that thousands of American and European citizens in the past two decades have been murdered at the hands of Sunni radicals from "friendly" American "partners" in the Middle East.

Apart from failing to promote better Iran-US ties, the inability on the part of leading US policymakers to shrug off their "Iran-phobic" tendencies — much to the delight of President Rouhani's hardline opponents in Iran — has not only dangerously increased regional tensions but it has also led to new schisms within the Arab world following the ostracising of Qatar and the possible dismantlement of the GCC by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. Apart from hosting the only Arab media outlet not directly or indirectly controlled by the Saudis, thereby airing "radical views" in support of the "Muslim Brotherhood", Qatar's other alleged main folly has been its failure to adopt a hostile posture towards Iran.

Their "Iran-phobic" tendencies — much to the delight of President Rouhani's hardline opponents in Iran — has not only dangerously increased regional tensions but it has also led to new schisms within the Arab world...

This sorry state of affairs descends to the ridiculous when a number of leading US political figures such as Senator John McCain, Mayor Rudi Giuliani and Ambassador John Bolton accept dubious speaking engagements and openly call for the overthrow of the Iranian regime, expressing their unswerving support for a muchdespised cult organisation (the Mojahedin Khalq or MEK). It is interesting to note that while these people keep blasting Iran for being the foremost "state sponsor of terrorism" — at a time when everyone acknowledges that non-state actors such as ISIS and Al Qaeda present the main international threat from terrorism — they are somehow "induced" to overlook the past history of their generous hosts who until recently were on the US (and EU) list of terrorist organisations and bear direct responsibility for murdering Americans in Iran. Today, the priority must surely lie in trying to defuse the dangerous crisis confronting the Middle East from North Africa to Syria, Yemen and the Persian Gulf. Only through dialogue and compromise — to start with between Iran and Saudi Arabia — can the escalation of the current crisis and the dangerous "war of words" in the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East be contained. At a time when the Iranians have repeatedly indicated their desire for such talks, it would be a mistake for "Iran-phobic" politicians in the US to jeopardise regional peace and stability by tacitly supporting intransigent Arabs and Israelis, bent on demonising and punishing Iran at any cost.

"Post-revolution, evolutionary Iran" (i.e. with radicalism on the wane and political reform on the rise) is much more on the right side of history than most others in the region...

The West, in particular the US, also needs to show greater appreciation for the fact that "post-revolution, evolutionary Iran" (i.e. with radicalism on the wane and political reform on the rise) is much more on the right side of history than most others in the region—irrespective of how many arms they buy. Also the failure of democracy following the "Arab Spring" is not a justification for perpetuating autocracy. Hence, it is highly important for all in the West to encourage and promote regional dialogue while keeping a balanced position between the quarreling sides that is cognizant of their legitimate interests.

This article was published in ‘Huffington Post’ on 18th July 2017

The Surreal ‘Grand Coalition’ Against Iran

The open manifestation of an ‘American-Sunni’ coalition against Iran with huge anti-Shia intonations around the region and particularly in Iraq, where the incumbent Shia government in Baghdad is supposedly a close ally of the United States does nothing to promote peace, stability and coexistence in the region.

Such an orchestration, designed to prop up a Saudi regime beset by serious internal squabbling along with an array of social and economic problems exacerbated by a military quagmire of its own making in Yemen, can neither contain Iran nor prevent previously disenfranchised Shias from Afghanistan and Pakistan to the shores of the Mediterranean in Syria and Lebanon, where they constitute more than 40% of the total population from having their say.

Despite the $350 billion ‘tribute’ paid by the Saudis that included the purchase of more than $100 billion of unwanted weaponry to the financially drained Kingdom, it is unlikely that in the final analysis, their reward will serve any purpose beyond the ‘photo opportunity’ that exhibited so many Sunni Arab leaders humbling themselves around President Trump.

Having secured his expected ‘tribute’ from the Arabs, President Trump then travelled to Israel and much to the chagrin of Israeli leaders, skirted around their key issues, such as continued US opposition to Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory or moving the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem by simply harping on the exaggerated anti-Iran rhetoric carried over from Riyadh.

Meanwhile, as this surreal and mendacious ‘US-Sunnis-Israeli Grand Coalition’ was being projected, the people of Iran were celebrating the re-election of President Hassan Rouhani who in the course of the past 4 years has stirred Iran away from his predecessor’s path of wanton agitation and lunacy, having most importantly taken the strident steps necessary for ending Iran’s nuclear stand off with the international community.

Repeated labeling of Iran as the ‘biggest state sponsor of terrorism’ or assertions such as ‘Iran’s provocative and unacceptable behavior in the region’ - especially under the presidency of Hassan Rouhani, simply lacks the thrust and luster that it once had in the 1980s and the 1990s. It is a fact that since 911, non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and more recently ISIS have almost completely monopolized the terrorism threat directed against the West and in the case of ISIS with equal venom again Iran and more generally Shias in the region.

Therefore, it is surreal to watch Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabi cronies exonerating themselves from any association with various acts of terrorism carried out against people in the West during the past two decades and falsely levying the blame on Shias in general and Iran in particular. This clear deception, camouflaged and sweetened by payments of billions of dollars of tribute to the US, becomes even more surreal in view of the fact that there has never been any evidence of Iranian or Shia involvement in any of the attacks that have been carried out in Europe or America.

It is even more ironic that at a time when the Iranian people have so blatantly exhibited their preference for moderation and peaceful coexistence by soundly silencing those who continue to advocate radicalism and confrontation, such an outrageous and unwarranted display of open hostility should be orchestrated against them.

So far, Iranian reaction to these unwarranted provocations has remained relatively moderate. Thus instead of continuing such rash policies that only increase tension and instability in the region, it would seem more prudent that steps should be taken to encourage dialogue and diplomacy in order to defuse tension and prevent further division and misunderstanding.

While there is undeniable validity in some of the past Saudi grievances voiced against the Islamic Republic, it is important to note that since the advent of the Rouhani government, Iran’s entire demeanor has undergone a fundamental shift, thereby allowing dialogue and diplomacy to play a decisive role.

The re-election of Rouhani who has pledged to remove non-nuclear sanctions through diplomacy offers a unique opportunity for the US to resume its dialogue with Iran, while both Iran and Saudi also need to manage their differences, much like they did prior to the Iranian revolution. Surreal exhibitions, such as those exhibited in Riyadh instead of reducing tension, stopping carnage and restoring much needed peace in places like Syria and Yemen, only widen differences by adversely exposing the region to further divisions and external meddling.

This article was published in ‘Open Democracy’ on 8th June 2017

Dr. Mehrdad Khonsari

Born in Tehran, Iran, Mehrdad Khonsari is an Iranian politician and former diplomat. After completing his undergraduate and postgraduate degrees at Georgetown University and The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in the USA, Khonsari began his career as a diplomat, and entered politics shortly after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. He later (1995) obtained his PhD from the London School of Economics. An active student of international politics, Khonsari was a Senior Research Consultant at the Centre for Arab and Iranian Studies in London from 1990-2010.

Mehrdad Khonsari received his primary and secondary schooling in Iran, Ireland, France, England and the United States where he was awarded a high school diploma in 1967 from Bellaire Senior High School in Houston, Texas. Mehrdad Khonsari next attended New York University to study Electrical Engineering before transferring to the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, DC were in 1972 he received his undergraduate degree (Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service). Following his entry into the Iranian Foreign Service, he was later sent on a scholarship to The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy where he completed his master's degree in 1976 which was followed in 1978 with an M.A.L.D. (Master of Art in Law and Diplomacy). Although Mehrdad Khonsari was admitted to the Fletcher School’s PhD program, the completion of his thesis was disrupted by the advent of the Iranian Revolution. However, having switched to the London School of Economics and Political science (LSE), he was able to obtain his PhD in the field of International Relations in 1995.

Having begun his internship at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1968 (serving in Tehran, Washington and the UN in New York), and having passed the MFA’s entrance examinations, Mehrdad Khonsari began his diplomatic career in 1972. From 1973-75, prior to being posted to the Iranian Mission to the United Nations, he served as a member of the Secretariat of the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1977, he was transferred to the Iranian Embassy in London where he also became a Visiting Research Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. In June 1978 he was placed in charge of the Embassy’s Cultural Section prior to becoming Press Attaché following the start of unrest leading to the Iranian Revolution. Following the execution of former Foreign Minister, Abbas Ali Khalatbari, Mehrdad Khonsari ended his diplomatic career by resigning from the Iranian Foreign Ministry. During his period as an Iranian diplomat, Mehrdad Khonsari also served as a member of the Iranian delegation to the 23rd, 24th, 25th, 29th and 31st Sessions of the UN General Assembly in New York; the ‘Summer Sessions’ of the UN Economic & Social Council, July-Aug 1976 and July–August 1977; as well as the 10th Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament May–July 1978.

From 1979-1984, Mehrdad Khonsari worked as a Consultant in International Affairs for the Saudi Arabian multinational business organization, the ‘Shobokshi Group’ [1] while at the same serving as the Managing Director of the UK based Middle Eastern Charitable Trust, the ‘Avicenna Foundation’ (which was later transformed into the ‘Centre for Arab and Iranian Studies’ where Mehrdad Khonsari was ‘Senior Research Fellow’ from 1992-2010). Since 1984, Mehrdad Khonsari has been an Iranian political activist having served as an Adviser to Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar (1984–87) and Reza Pahlavi, the former Crown Prince of Iran (1987-1991). Since 1991, he has served as Secretary General of ‘Front Line’ -the Constitutionalist Movement of Iran (1991-2010), Member of the ‘Iran Referendum Campaign (2004-2005) and as Secretary General of Green Wave (2010-2014). Since January 2015, Mehrdad Khonsari is Secretary General of the newly established but currently inactive ‘Organization for Economic Reconstruction and National Reconciliation (BAAM).

Mehrdad Khonsari was a ‘Visiting Research Fellow’ at the International Institute For Strategic Studies (1978). In 1977 and 1978, he had travelled to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, U.A.E., Saudi Arabia and Yemen on research mission for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the subject of ‘Iran-Arab Relations’ and how best to expand and enhance them in the future. Mehrdad Khonsari was Editor of the London-based Iranfile, an independent monthly analysis of current affairs and ‘Khate Moghaddam’ with special emphasis on economics and politics. Apart from numerous TV broadcasts and articles in Persian [2] and English,[3] he has conducted extensive research [4] and participated in many international conferences in various countries in Europe, North America, the Middle East [5] and the South Caucuses. From 2005-2008, he was Managing Director of Payam Azadi TV (based in Los Angeles) and from 2012-2014, he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of ‘Raha TV’, a London-based satellite television station operating for audiences in Iran. For 2 years, Mehrdad Khonsari as the only guest of the weekly program ‘Bardashte Dovom’,[6] provided up to date commentary and analysis concerning various aspects of political realities in Iran.

Mehrdad Khonsari is a Senior Consultant and a founding member of the “Iranian Centre for Policy Studies’ established in France in 2017.

Mohammad Jawad Akbarin

Born in Babol, Iran, Mohammad Jawad Akbarin is an Iranian writer and journalist who currently resides in France. He is also a respected theological scholar having studied under the tutelage of Eminent ‘Shia Sources of Emulation’ (‘Marjas’) such as Grand Ayatollahs ‘Abdollah Javadi Amoli’, and ‘Hossein Ali Montazeri, while being hugely influenced in his earlier days by the thinking of two major Iranian theological scholars of the late 1990’s, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari and Abdolkarim Soroush.

Akbarin began learning Arabic literature in 1988 at ‘Elmieh Rouhie’ (Mirzaki) in Babol. That is where he familiarised himself with the bases of the Islamic culture and increased his general knowledge of Islam (Fegh).

In 1992, he started religious and spirituality studies in Qum. His most important teaching scholars during his years of religious studies were Grand Ayatollahs ‘Abdollah Javadi Amoli’, and ‘Hossein Ali Montazeri’. From 1992-2002, he participated in the ‘Koran Interpretation’ classes of Grand Ayatollah Abdollah Javadi Amoli.

In 2004, he immigrated to Lebanon where he pursued his Islamic training with Ayatollah Seyed Mohammad Hossein Fazlollah.

He obtained a bachelors degree on the subject of ‘Religion, Science and Philosophy’ from the Islamic Azad University of Tehran, a ‘Master of Islamic Science’ from ‘Beirut Islamic Research University’ in Lebanon and a PhD on the subject of ‘Analysis and Interpretation of the Koran’ from the Islamic Research University of Cairo in Egypt.

He was a researcher in Tehran between 1993 and 1997 and studied in particular, western culture and the works of the German philosopher, Martin Heidegger. He was also greatly influenced by the thoughts of two major Iranian thinkers at of the late 1990’s, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari and Abdolkarim Soroush.

Journalistic Background
Apart from being a regular contributor to many publications, Akbarin’s journalistic background has included the following associations:
2014– Member of the International Federation of Journalists. Member of the Editorial Board of the monthly analytical magazine «Mihan», published Paris
2012-2014 Editor in chief of the online newspaper «Rahe Digar»
2012-2014 Editor-in-Chief of the London based, Persian ‘News and Analysis] Satellite TV Station, ‘Raha TV’.
2011 Editor–in-chief of the online newspaper «Mihan»
2010 Journalist, Online newspaper «Deutsche Welle»
2009-2010 Member of the Editorial Board of the Online newspaper «Jarass» linked to the ‘Green Movement’
2009- Writer, journalist and editor for the Online newspapers «Roozonline»
2009 Close collaboration with the Beirut based TV channel, ‘Future TV’
2008 Member of the digital staff of the Beirut based newspaper, «Al Mostaqbal»
2005 Collaboration with the Beirut based newspaper «Al Nahar»
2003 A selected Judge for the religious category of ‘the National Iranian Press Competition’
1998-2003 Member of the Editorial Board of the weekly Tehran based newspapers, «Gounagoun», ‘Chel-Cheragh, ‘Salaam’, ‘Sobhe Emrouz’. ‘Fath’, ‘Bayan’, ‘Bahar’ and ‘Nowrouz’

Political Background
2001-2002 Secretary of ‘the Clerical Student Assembly of the Followers of the Line of Imam [Khate-e-Emam]’, 2002-2004 Secretary of the Qum Branch of the reformist ‘Islamic Participation Party’ (‘Jebheye Mosharekat’)

Imprisonment and Exile
2000-2001 In spring 2000, following the publication of four critical newspaper editorials in ‘Sobhe Emrooz’, ‘Fath’, ‘Bayan’ and ‘Bahar’, M. J. Akbarin was summoned to the offices of the ‘Special Clerical Prosecution Office’ in Qum. Following a brief investigation, he was ‘tried’ on charges of ‘propagating against the ruling order’. In the absence of his lawyer and a valid trial by jury, in violation of the prevailing laws pertaining to press and political trials, he was sentenced to a prison term of 1 year. Objection to this ruling voiced by the ‘Human Rights Committee’ of the Sixth Islamic Parliament was subsequently overruled.
2002 40 days after his release from incarceration that had begun at Qum’s Central Prison in January 2002, he was once again summoned by the “Clerical Court’ of Isfahan and placed in custody on charges pertaining to a ‘critical speech’ he had made at party meeting (‘Jebheye Mosharekat’) in ‘Shahr Reza’.
2007 Summoned again by a Tehran court on charges pertaining to his provocative writings on the need for gender equality with emphasis on criticizing a long established tradition of promoting ‘male domination of women’ (‘Roozonline’, 08/03/07). As a result, he was once again placed in custody just as he was about to board a plane returning him to Lebanon. He was then banned from leaving the country and the special ‘Clerical Court’ in Qum summoned him for a new series of interrogations without specifying charges levied against him. Fear of further arbitrary imprisonment forced him to clandestinely flee Iran for Lebanon via Iraqi Kurdistan in winter 2007.
2009 Working with the local media in Lebanon, following his critical reviews of the 2009 Iranian presidential election, he was subjected to serious threats by the Iranian embassy in Beirut, forcing him to flee Lebanon for France with the aid of ‘RSF’ (Reporters Without Borders).
2009- Consistent Researcher on Middle East and Islamic Studies.

The Iranian Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS)

The mission of ICPS, established in 2017, is to provide an accurate examination of events that shape Iranian domestic and foreign policy with the distinct aim that its analysis may help the adoption of policies that best promote and protect the national interest of the Iranian nation.

The complex circumstances in the region and the world in recent years and its implications on Iranian politics, especially in the aftermath of the nuclear agreement, have hurled Iran into a new era much different than the past.

This new era has three distinct features:
1. The increasing empowerment of technocrats, committed to regional peace and stability, and insistent upon establishing a constructive relationship with the outside world.
2. The rising status of educated middle classes and their demands
3. The increasingly more important role that is played by social media and Internet communications in the world.

In times, when both the Iranian political scene as well as events in the broader international community is witnessing a process of fundamental transition, simple reliance upon traditional findings based on out-dated analytical yardsticks only leads to simplified deductions that are clearly inadequate. Failure to understand constantly changing developments, can thus lead to serious miscalculations, which can in turn deprive Iran, the region and the wider world of rare opportunities for promoting non-violent and progressive change in Iran along with peaceful and constructive relations in the region.

There are a number of important research centres within Iran charged with the task of collecting facts and providing policy analysis. However, due to the fact that they are mostly tied with various governmental institutions, they are understandably restricted in providing the kind of unbiased and objective reporting that is neither contained nor restricted because of certain obvious boundaries.

ICPS through its connections with highly respected international experts and credible ‘Think Tanks’ around the world as well as its own host of experts both inside and outside Iran, intends to fill this vacuum. This will be done through the production of daily, weekly and monthly briefs (on demand in 4 languages: Farsi, English, Arabic and French) as well as the organization of conferences and seminars (including ‘web-seminars’) with the participation of key experts on subjects of national importance concerning the future of Iran (all to be subsequently posted on the Centre’s website).